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Our model shows that when regulation is based on credit ratings, banks with low charter value 
maximize shareholder value by minimizing capital and selecting identically-rated loans and 
bonds with the highest systematic risk. This regulatory arbitrage is possible if the credit spreads 
on same-rated loans and bonds are greater when their systematic risk (debt beta) is higher. We 
empirically confirm this relationship between credit spreads, ratings, and debt betas. We also 
show that banks with lower capital select syndicated loans with higher debt betas and credit 
spreads, and banks with lower charter value choose overall assets with higher systematic risk. 
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Governments insure the liabilities of several types of financial institutions. Prime examples are federal 
government insurance of bank deposits and state government guarantees of insurance company policies.1 A 
consequence of these guarantees is that financial institutions may take excessive risks that expose 
governments to large losses from insolvencies (e.g., Kareken and Wallace (1978)). While regulation, such as 
minimum capital standards, aims to reduce these risk-taking incentives, the current regulatory framework 
may actually worsen a particular type of moral hazard. Kupiec (2004) and Pennacchi (2006) show that when 
regulation fails to differentially penalize systematic and idiosyncratic risks, banks and insurance companies 
may have incentives to make loans and invest in bonds that are highly likely to suffer losses during an 
economic downturn. The danger is that financial institutions will herd into systematically-risky investments 
that increase the likelihood of systemic failures. 
In this paper, we begin with a model that illustrates how moral hazard can result from ratings-based 
capital standards. These standards can lead to regulatory arbitrage whereby banks with low charter 
(franchise) value choose assets with high systematic risk and binding capital requirements. This arbitrage 
arises when capital standards are based on external or internal credit ratings that reflect “real-world” 
(physical) expected default losses and not “risk-neutral” (systematic risk-adjusted) expected default losses. 
We extend a standard structural model of an insured financial institution to show that low charter value 
creates a desire to minimize capital, which can be accomplished under ratings-based regulation by choosing 
systematically-risky bonds and loans. 
Next we provide empirical evidence consistent with the model. This evidence comes in two parts. 
First, we show that there is, indeed, scope for such arbitrage because identically-rated bonds and loans 
display significant differences in yields (credit spreads) that reflect differences in their systematic default 
risks. Thus, by investing in a relatively systematically-risky bond or loan, a bank or insurance company earns 
a systematic risk premium but is not penalized by higher ratings-based capital requirements. The financial 
institution can exploit this guarantee subsidy and increase its shareholder value simply by selecting the 
highest yielding bonds and loans of a given regulatory credit rating, a form of “reaching for yield.” 
                                                     
1 Another example is federal government insurance of private defined-benefit pension plans. Brown (2010) surveys 
various government insurance programs.  
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Second, we investigate systematic risk-taking by banks. Examining commercial banks’ investments in 
syndicated loans, we find that banks with relatively low capital ratios select loans of a given credit rating that 
have relatively high systematic risk and relatively high credit spreads. In addition, we derive model-based 
estimates of charter values and total asset portfolio systematic risks for a subsample of banks that have 
publicly-traded stock and credit default swaps (CDS). These estimates confirm our model’s prediction that 
relatively low charter value leads banks to choose assets with overall higher systematic risk. 
Our paper contributes to two strands of the literature. The first relates debt yields to systematic default 
risks. Hull, Predescu, and White (2005) show that average credit spreads of corporate bonds grouped by their 
credit ratings are much higher than historical loss rates for their rating class, suggesting the presence of a 
systematic risk premium. Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann (2001) find that average credit spread changes 
of corporate bond portfolios sorted by rating class and maturity are related to Fama and French (1993) risk 
factors. Driessen (2005) studies the components of corporate yields and, like the previous papers, restricts 
systematic risk to be the same for a given rating class. Systematic risk factors also explain individual 
corporate bonds’ changes in spreads (Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001)) and excess returns 
(Schaefer and Strebulaev (2008)), though these findings may be due to changes in expected default losses or 
systematic risk premia. Perhaps closest to our paper is Hilscher and Wilson (2017) who relate a corporation’s 
long-term Standard & Poor’s (S&P) rating to various time-series estimates of the firm’s default risk. They 
find that the firm’s credit rating better reflects its systematic default risk than its simple probability of failure. 
Our test of how debt yields reflect systematic risk is distinct from this previous literature and is 
motivated by a very specific question. We ask whether differences in the credit spreads of identically-rated 
corporate bonds and syndicated loans are higher when the debt has greater systematic default risk. An 
affirmative answer to this question is a necessary condition for the plausibility of our particular theory of 
ratings-based regulatory arbitrage. Indeed using data on either bonds or loans, we find that credit spreads of 
identically-rated debt are significantly greater when the debt’s issuer has a higher systematic risk of default.2 
Our measure of systematic risk, referred to as “debt beta,” is theoretically-grounded and calculated from 
corporate information available at the time that the bond or loan is originated. Moreover, since we use the 
                                                     
2 This result may be surprising given Hilscher and Wilson’s (2017) finding that credit ratings better reflect systematic 
risk than the probability of default. However, they are not necessarily inconsistent since we show that credit ratings do 
not account for all of a corporation’s systematic default risk reflected in its debt’s credit spreads. Moreover, we use the 
credit rating and credit spread of the individual debt issue while they use the credit rating of the firm. 
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debt’s credit rating and its credit spread at the time of origination, our test avoids problems arising from 
“stale” credit ratings or from differences between the issuing firm’s rating and its debt’s (issue) rating. 
Our test of whether credit spreads reflect systematic default risk beyond that implied by the security’s 
rating has precedent but for non-corporate, “structured” securities. Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2009) note 
that pooling loans diversifies away idiosyncratic risk, so that mortgage-backed securities (MBS), asset-
backed securities (ABS), and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) possess higher systematic risk 
compared to identically-rated corporate bonds. Yet, they fail to uncover evidence of a relatively higher 
systematic risk premium in structured security yields. However, other research, including Collin-Dufresne, 
Goldstein, and Yang (2012), finds otherwise.3 
Having confirmed the potential for regulatory arbitrage by choosing the most systematically-risky and 
highest credit spread debt of a given credit rating, our paper’s second main contribution tests for such 
behavior by U.S. commercial banks. Prior research has found evidence consistent with ratings-based 
arbitrage by other government-insured financial institutions. Becker and Ivashina (2015) study insurance 
companies’ choice of corporate bonds. Among bonds with similar credit ratings, they document that 
insurance companies tend to select a greater proportion of bonds with relatively high credit spreads 
compared to the bonds chosen by uninsured financial institutions.4 This behavior is most prevalent for 
insurance companies with lower regulatory capital and leads to greater systematic risk exposure. Merrill, 
Nadauld, and Strahan (2014) provide complementary evidence that insurance companies suffering the 
greatest capital declines during the early 2000’s shifted their portfolios to highly-rated, but more 
systematically-risky, structured securities.5 Efing (2015) analyzes German banks and finds that those with 
relatively low capital invest in ABS with relatively high credit spreads compared to ABS of the same rating. 
Our paper is the first to investigate banks’ systematic risk-taking by studying their investment choices 
both at the loan level and at the aggregate asset level. First, we analyze 165 U.S. banks’ investments in 
syndicated loans using data from the Shared National Credit Program and find that banks with lower capital 
                                                     
3 Chernenko, Hanson, and Sunderam (2014) find that pre-crisis average yields on AAA-rated non-prime residential 
MBS and CDOs were higher by 18 bp and 30 bp, respectively, compared to the average yield on AAA-rated corporate 
bonds.  Merrill, Nadauld, and Strahan (2014) also estimate that the average yields on AAA-rated structured securities 
were almost 36 bp higher than the average yield on AAA-rated corporate bonds. 
4 As an example, they report that among newly issued bonds in the AAA to A regulatory rating class, insurance 
companies purchase 75% of bonds in the lowest spread quartile and 82% of bonds in the highest spread quartile, and 
this difference is statistically significant. 
5 Chernenko, Hanson, and Sunderam (2014) also show that holdings of high-yielding structured securities were greater 
for insurance companies that were poorly capitalized and that had a stock, rather than mutual, organization. 
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ratios tend to invest in loans with the highest systematic risk (debt betas). Moreover, the loans chosen by 
these banks have relatively high credit spreads conditional on the loans’ ratings. Thus, consistent with our 
theory of regulatory capital arbitrage, these lower-capitalized banks appear to reach for yield by choosing 
high credit spread, high debt beta loans. 
Second, we investigate systematic risk-taking at the aggregate asset portfolio level using a sample of 
banks that have both publicly-traded stock and CDS contracts. Combining stock market and CDS data allows 
us to extract model-implied measures of a bank’s charter value and the systematic risk of its aggregate asset 
portfolio. As predicted by our theory, we find an inverse relationship between these banks’ charter values 
and the systematic risks of their asset portfolios. 
Our paper is certainly not the only one to identify flaws in risk-based capital standards. For example, 
Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2013) document that bank credit lines backing commercial paper conduits 
were de facto credit guarantees but qualified under Basel standards as liquidity guarantees. Thus, banks’ risk-
weight to the credit exposure was only 10% of that had the same exposure been recorded on-balance sheet. 
Acharya and Steffen (2015) find that low-capitalized European banks took advantage of zero Basel II risk-
weights to increase their holdings of the riskiest sovereign debt. Boyson, Falhenbrach, and Stulz (2016) show 
that low-charter value U.S. banks issued Trust Preferred Securities that effectively increased their leverage 
without lowering their Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio. 
The shortcoming from basing capital requirements on credit ratings is more subtle than these other 
flaws of risk-based regulation. Yet its consequences are potentially devastating to financial system stability. 
The evidence we present does not simply imply that ratings measure bond and loan default risks with error, 
so that ratings-based regulation is imperfect. If, relative to credit spreads, ratings errors were purely 
idiosyncratic, there would be less concern with banks “reaching for yield” by choosing the highest credit-
spread debt of a given rating. Rather, we show that credit spreads reflect systematic risk not accounted for in 
ratings, and banks with low charter value and capital select loans and assets with not only higher credit 
spreads but also greater systematic risk. These findings are worrisome because they imply that ratings-based 
regulation leads low charter value banks to choose the least capital and the most systematically risky 
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investments, thereby making simultaneous failures particularly sensitive to economic downturns.6 Besides 
worsening systemic risk, ratings-based regulation can give banks a preference for funding borrowers with 
high systematic risk, thereby misallocating the economy’s capital toward excessively pro-cyclical projects. 
The flaw in ratings-based regulation that leads banks to choose systematically-risky common 
exposures highlights a broader point. To avoid regulatory arbitrage, capital standards must not only penalize 
systematic risks but must also properly account for the correlation structure of a bank’s portfolio. Regulation 
that imposes asset-specific capital charges without reference to the asset return correlations of a bank’s total 
asset portfolio can create incentives for banks to take excessive portfolio risk, even if it is not systematic. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a model where ratings-based regulation gives low 
charter value banks incentives to minimize capital and take high systematic risks. Section 3 confirms the 
model’s assumption that the credit spreads of identically-rated corporate bonds or syndicated loans are 
higher when issuers have more systematic default risk. Section 4 presents direct evidence of regulatory 
arbitrage by showing that U.S. banks with relatively low capital or charter value select syndicated loans and 
overall asset portfolios with relatively higher credit spreads and systematic risks. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. A Model of Incentives under Ratings-Based Capital Requirements 
This section illustrates why ratings-based regulation can create incentives for low charter value 
financial institutions to take high systematic risk. Its model has similarities to the binomial models in Kupiec 
(2004) and Pennacchi (2006), but focuses on the specific effects of ratings-based regulation and uses the 
continuous-time setting of Merton (1974, 1977) and Galai and Masulis (1976). The model derives variables, 
including a “debt beta” measure of systematic risk, that are directly employed in the paper’s empirical tests. 
2.1.  Model Assumptions 
A financial institution is assumed to invest in a portfolio of bonds and loans that it funds by issuing 
shareholders’ equity and government-insured liabilities. For concreteness, we refer to this institution as a 
“bank” and its liabilities as “deposits.” However, Cummins (1988) shows that with minor modeling changes, 
the institution can be interpreted as an “insurance company” and its liabilities as “insurance policies.” 
                                                     
6 Other models, such as Penati and Protopapadakis (1988) and Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007), predict that banks are 
motivated to make common investments, though not necessarily systematically risky ones. The common exposure 
incentive in these models arises because simultaneous bank failures make a government bailout more likely. Our paper 
predicts herding into systematically risky exposures even if doing so does not raise the likelihood of a bailout. 
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At the initial date 0, the bank issues insured deposits of D0 on which it pays the interest rate rd ≤ r, 
where r is the competitive, default-free interest rate. As in Merton (1978) and Marcus (1984), a below-
competitive deposit interest rate is a source of “charter” or “franchise” value. Shareholders contribute equity 
capital equal to K0, so initially the bank has tangible assets worth A0 = D0 + K0. These assets are a portfolio of 
default-risky bonds and loans issued by firms in m industries that are exposed to different sources of risk. 
Each firm has a capital structure that satisfies the assumptions in Merton (1974). If the bank maintains 
constant portfolio proportions invested in the m industries, Appendix A shows that the rate of return on the 
bank’s total assets is 
,1
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where σA,i is the volatility of returns from the bank’s loans and bonds of firms in industry i, dzi is the 
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the expected rate of return on the bank’s asset portfolio satisfies the relationship7 
Mrm ϕ β= +                                                                       (2) 






≡∑  is the bank’s total asset portfolio beta, ωi is the bank’s proportion of total assets held in 
bonds and loans of firms in industry i, and βD,i is the average debt beta of firms in industry i.8 
A government regulator sets the bank’s risk-based capital requirement and deposit insurance premium. 
The premium is set at date 0 but payable at the future date T, which also is the time that the regulator audits 
the bank. Let p be the (continuously-compounded) annual premium rate per deposit, so that the bank’s total 
premium to be paid at date T is DT(epT-1) and the sum of deposits plus premium payable at date T is 
                                                     
7 As in Merton (1978 p. 440), it is assumed that the bank pays a less-than-competitive deposit rate because depositors 
face high costs of transacting in securities markets. Yet enough lower-cost investors trade in securities markets and 
make them “sufficiently perfect” so that the capital asset pricing model holds. 
8 For analytical simplicity the bank is assumed to rebalance its loan and bond exposures such that industry and total 
asset volatilities remain constant. A richer model, such as Gornall and Strebulaev (2017) or Nagel and Purnanandam 






TD e D e
+= .9 Similar to Merton (1977), the bank fails and is closed at date T by the regular if AT < 
DTepT. The government regulator/deposit insurer incurs any loss required to pay off insured deposits. 
2.2. Capital Requirements: Fair versus Ratings-Based 
Research dating back to Merton (1977) recognizes that fair deposit insurance and capital standards 
equate the value of a bank’s insurance premium to the present value of its insurance losses, which equals a 
put option written on the bank’s assets with an exercise price equal to its promised payments: 
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where EQ[·] is the “risk-neutral” expectation,10 ( ) ( )( ) ( )211 0 0 2ln / /rT pTTd K D e D e T Tσ σ− = + +  , 
2 1d d Tσ= − , and Put(A0, X, T) is the value of a Black-Scholes put option written on assets currently worth 
A0, having exercise price X, and time until maturity of T. Key to equation (3) is that initial capital, K0, is set 
fairly when it makes the discounted risk-neutral expected losses, ( )0 0 , ,pTTPut K D D e T+ , equal to the value 
of the government insurance premium. 
As we explain in more detail in Section 4, in practice deposit insurance premiums are largely 
insensitive to risk and do not account for differences in systematic risk. Moreover, external credit ratings set 
by rating agencies such as Moody’s and S&P or internal credit ratings from Value at Risk (VaR) calculations 
are primarily based on real-world or “physical” expected default losses. As our empirical work confirms, 
identically-rated debt can have sizable differences in systematic default risk and credit spreads. An 
implication is that ratings-based capital requirements can be fair for only a single level of systematic risk or 
debt beta, and the fair debt beta for a given rating’s capital charge may differ from the actual beta of a bank’s 
loan or bond having that rating. So, while equation (2) shows that a bank’s true expected rate of return on 
assets equals Mrm ϕ β= + , actual capital requirements reflect an expected bank asset rate of return equal to 
                                                     
9 This insurance premium is analogous to a credit spread on deposits if deposits were competitively-priced (rd = r) and 
uninsured. In the absence of deposit insurance and regulation, uninsured depositors would set the credit spread, p, to 
make the date 0 fair value of their default-risky deposits equal to D0, the amount they contribute initially. 
10 The risk-neutral asset return process is / Qt tdA A rdt dzσ= + . 
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≡ ∑ and BD,i is the average debt beta that ratings-based regulation assigns to 
the bank’s loans and bonds of industry i. Hence, B is the bank’s portfolio beta implied by ratings-based 
standards, and in general B ≠ β so that mB ≠ m. 
Accounting for this disparity between true and capital regulation-implied betas of the bank’s assets, the 
actual relationship between premiums and minimum regulatory capital, Kmin, satisfies: 
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where ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )211 min 0 2ln / /M B TB rT pTT T Td K D e e D eϕ β σ σ− − = + +   and 2 1B B Td d σ= − . The ratings-
based standards in (4) lead to the same Black-Scholes formula as (3) except that the underlying asset value 
( )min 0K D+ is replaced everywhere with ( ) ( )min 0 M B TK D eϕ β −+ . Since put options are decreasing functions of 
their underlying asset value, when β > B the option value in equation (4) is less than that in equation (3). In 
turn, actual minimum capital standards, Kmin, are lower than the corresponding fair, no-subsidy level. 
The intuition for this result is that by choosing a higher asset portfolio beta of β > B, a bank earns a 
higher asset risk premium that raises its excess portfolio rate of return by ϕM×(β-B). These excess profits 
lower the bank’s physical (real-world) expected portfolio losses but not its risk-neutral expected portfolio 
losses because the excess profits are only compensation for greater systematic risk. Consequently, for a given 
portfolio volatility σ, a higher asset portfolio β chosen by the bank lowers its ratings-based minimum capital 
requirement, Kmin, even though its fair required capital is unchanged. 
2.3 Shareholder Value under Ratings-Based Regulation 
Following Marcus (1984) and Keeley (1990), we assume that shareholders’ equity reflects both the 
bank’s residual tangible asset value plus a “charter value” equal to the value of excess profits from future 
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where C is the bank’s charter value that is lost if it fails at date T and equals the value of rents from issuing 
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future deposits.11 As detailed in Appendix A, the date 0 value of shareholders’ equity can be written as 

( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )0 0 0 0 0 2
Capital Value of Mispriced Deposit Insurance Current and Future Charter Value
, , 1 1 dr r TpT rT pT rTT TE K Put K D D e T e D e D e e CN d
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             (6) 
Equation (6) shows that the market value of shareholders’ equity equals the sum of initial capital, the value 
of a government deposit insurance subsidy, and the bank’s current and future charter value.   
2.4 Bank Choice of Capital and Systematic Risk 
Since our focus is on how ratings-based regulation affects systematic risk, we take as given the bank’s 
asset portfolio volatility, σ. We also assume that the bank fixes the average rating of its portfolio’s debt so 
that its ratings-based portfolio beta, B, is given. Further, suppose that regulators fix the deposit insurance 
rate, p, and set the bank’s minimum capital requirement, Kmin, based on ratings according to equation (4).12 
Importantly, note that equation (4) depends on the bank’s true portfolio beta, β, which makes the ratings-
based minimum capital requirement a decreasing function of this beta, Kmin(β). 
Now consider the bank’s choices of its initial capital, K0, and its portfolio’s true beta, β, where these 
choices satisfy Kmin(β) ≤ K0 ≤ Kmax and βmin ≤ β ≤ βmax.13 We assume the bank chooses K0 and β to maximize 
its shareholders’ value in excess of its shareholders’ contributed capital, which is the left hand side of 
equation (6). The following proposition gives the solution to the bank’s maximization problem. 
Proposition: The choice of initial capital, K0, and asset beta, β, that maximize the bank’s 
shareholder value in excess of contributed capital, E0-K0, is either: i) K0= Kmin(βmax) with β = βmax; or 
ii) K0= Kmax with an indeterminate choice of β. For sufficiently small charter value C, the choice is i). 
Else, the choice is ii). 
Proof: See Appendix A.  
To understand this proposition, note from equation (6) that the bank’s excess shareholder value, E0-K0, 
comprises two components: the value of mispriced deposit insurance; and current and future charter value. 
                                                     
11 Appendix A equation (A6) shows that ( )( ) ( )0 1 / 1dr r T rTC D e e− − −= − − . 
12 As mentioned earlier, in practice p is largely risk-insensitive, but our qualitative results are unchanged as long as it 
does not vary with differences in systematic risk. Also note that if ratings were based on systematic risk so that B = β, 
then capital standards would be fair for any choice of σ. 
13 While Kmin is given by equation (4), considerations outside of the model are assumed to determine the limits Kmax, 
βmin, and βmax. For example, a corporate tax disadvantage of equity may limit the bank’s capital to Kmax and technology 
and leverage limits may constrain borrowing firms’ debt betas to be between βmin and βmax. 
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The bank faces a tradeoff when maximizing these two components because the first is a strictly decreasing 
function of initial capital while the second is a strictly increasing function of capital. When charter value that 
would be lost in bankruptcy, C, is large, the bank seeks to reduce its likelihood of failure by setting its initial 
capital at the maximum, K0= Kmax. Instead, when C is sufficiently small, excess shareholder value is 
maximized by exploiting the insurance subsidy and setting minimum capital. Now there would be no subsidy 
at this minimum if capital standards were set fairly according to equation (3). But the ratings-based standards 
in equation (4) permit the possibility of below-fair capital if the bank chooses high systematic risk. Hence, 
the bank’s deposit insurance subsidy is maximized by choosing K0= Kmin(βmax) and β = βmax. 





= ∑ as given, but now suppose the bank can 
choose ωi. Note from equation (4) that a low charter value bank’s insurance subsidy is a function of the 
difference ( )max Bβ − =  ( )max, ,1
m
i D i D ii
Bω β
=
−∑ , where max,D iβ is the maximum debt beta of firms in industry i. 
Taking a more general interpretation of ωi as the bank’s portfolio proportion allocated to asset class i, banks 
would prefer to invest in asset classes where the difference between the maximum debt beta and the debt 
beta that ratings-based regulation assigns to the class, ( )max, ,D i D iBβ − , is greatest. This insight may explain 
why some banks heavily invested in highly-rated structured securities, such as MBS, which had low ratings-
based capital charges but inherently high systematic risk (Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2009)). Nevertheless, 
for any asset class in which a low charter value bank invests (e.g., syndicated loans), our model predicts that 
the bank will choose the highest beta debt from among identically-rated debt. 
2.5 Implications for Yields on Identically-Rated Debt 
The preceding theory of regulatory arbitrage assumes that banks can choose a systematic risk for their 
loans and bonds, β, that exceeds the systematic risk implied by ratings-based capital requirements, B. 
Effectively, the bank earns a systematic risk premium of ϕMβ on its assets but its government-insured cost of 
funding charges only a premium of ϕMB. Consequently, as shown in equation (4), the bank’s government 
subsidy is a function of the difference: ( )M Bϕ β − . 
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A necessary condition for our theory of regulatory arbitrage is that the prices of default-risky loans and 
bonds reflect systematic risk premia but their credit ratings do not, at least not to the same extent. Theory 




y r PD LGD
r PD LGD ϕ β
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= + × +
                                                               (7) 
where βD is the debt’s beta and PD and LGD are the debt’s real-world annualized probability of default and 
proportional loss given default, respectively. Therefore, PD×LGD is the debt’s annualized expected default 
losses. These variables with a Q superscript reflect their risk-neutral counterparts. If credit ratings were based 
on risk-neutral expected default losses, PDQ×LGDQ, it would be possible to set ratings-based capital 
requirements that preclude systematic risk arbitrage. Instead, if ratings are based primarily on real-world 
expected default losses, PD×LGD, equation (7) indicates that arbitrage entails selecting from identically-
rated debt those bonds and loans with the highest debt betas, βD. Such a choice is equivalent to “reaching for 
yield” by choosing this highest yielding debt of a given credit rating. 
In the next section, we first empirically test whether yields on bonds and loans reflect systematic risk 
premia not incorporated in credit ratings. The following section then considers evidence for our model’s 
prediction that low charter value banks choose low capital and high systematic risk. 
 
3. Credit Spreads, Credit Ratings, and Systematic Risk 
This section analyzes the yield equation (7) to test our model’s assumption that same-rated debt yields 
are higher when the debt has higher systematic risk. Statements by credit rating agencies indicate that their 
ratings reflect corporate debt’s real world probability of default or expected default losses, PD×LGD.15 Yet, 
Hilscher and Wilson (2017) find evidence that a firm’s (issuer’s) credit rating is a better predictor of the 
firm’s systematic risk of default than its real world default probability. However, we know of no research 
that uses yields and credit ratings on individual debt issues to test whether differences in yields, conditional 
on their ratings, are related to each debt issuer’s systematic risk. We perform this test starting with a sample 
of corporate bonds. Following that, we consider a sample of syndicated loans. 
                                                     
14 The Merton (1974) model’s default risky debt yields also can be approximated as equation (7). 
15 See Moody’s (2006). An exception is the new ratings criteria that S&P announced during the financial crisis 
(Standard & Poor’s, 2008, 2010) that suggests it will take account of greater systematic risk: “Under S&P’s new 
criteria,…we may feel that two securities have similar default risk, but if we believe one is more prone to a sharp 
downgrade in periods of economic stress, it will be rated lower initially.” Moody’s has not announced a similar change. 
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3.1. Data and Variables for Corporate Bonds 
We obtained data from DCM Analytics on an international sample of corporate bonds issued over the 
years 1999 to 2010. These bonds are investment grade, fixed coupon, non-callable, non-convertible, non-
perpetual, and non-government guaranteed. The data have information on each issuer (nationality, industry, 
etc.) and each bond’s characteristics (years to maturity, face value, currency, etc.). It also contains each 
bond’s issue credit rating and credit spread (the yield minus the yield on a government bond of the same 
currency and maturity). Since the ratings and spreads are both set at the time of issuance, they are ideal for 
testing whether they incorporate similar information.16 Based on each bond’s ISIN codes, we obtain from 
Bloomberg the issuer’s stock returns for the 52 weeks prior to the bond’s issuance and the contemporaneous 
returns of the MSCI World Index.17 Our final sample is 3,924 bonds issued by 620 listed firms, mostly from 
North America, Europe, and Japan. 
As the yield equation (7) suggests, the bond issuer’s debt beta is a key variable in our analysis. 
Consistent with our model and Galai and Masulis (1976), the issuing firm’s date 0 debt beta equals 
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where A0, D0, E0 are current market values and βA, βD, βE are betas of the firm’s assets, debt, and equity, 
respectively, ( ) ( ) ( )211 20ln / /d A X r σ σ ττ= + +   , 2 1d d σ τ= − , σ is the firm’s asset volatility, and X is 
the promised payment on its debt to be paid in τ years.18 
As detailed in Appendix B, we compute each bond issuer’s debt beta using equation (8) and data on 
the issuer’s market value of equity, the beta and total volatility of its stock returns, and balance sheet 
information on the issuer’s debt. Similar to Marcus and Shaked (1984), the Merton (1974) model equations 
for each issuer’s market value and volatility of equity are used to calculate the implied market value and 
volatility of the issuer’s assets, A0 and σ, respectively. Along with an estimate of the issuer’s stock return 
beta, βE, the issuer’s debt beta in equation (8) can then be calculated. In the same fashion, we use an estimate 
of the residual volatility of the issuer’s stock returns to compute the debt’s residual volatility, which is a 
                                                     
16 Other studies sometime use issuer ratings and secondary market bond spreads. Since ratings may become “stale” due 
to infrequent adjustments, new information may be reflected in secondary market spreads prior to ratings. 
17 Our main findings are robust to using the issuer’s domestic stock index rather than the MSCI World Index. 
18 Our estimates of debt beta assume τ = 10 years, though the paper’s results are robust to assuming a 5-year maturity. 
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measure of the idiosyncratic risk of the firm’s debt. 
Our calculations of an issuer’s debt beta and debt residual volatility only use the issuer’s stock market 
and balance sheet information just prior to the bond issue. In principle, debt beta and residual volatility could 
be estimated from a time series of the bond’s post-issuance returns. Yet many bonds are traded infrequently, 
leading to return series that can be stale and limited to low frequencies. Moreover, since our goal is to test 
whether a bond’s new-issue credit spread reflects systematic risk beyond that of its issue rating, avoiding the 
use of future post-issuance information is critical.19 
Table 1 provides mean values of some relevant issue and issuer characteristics by rating class (Panel 
A) and by year (Panel B). Panel A’s summary statistics use broad letter ratings (AAA/Aaa, AA/Aa, A/A, and 
BBB/Baa), though our subsequent tests use finer notch-level ratings (AAA/Aaa, AA+/Aa1, AA/Aa2, etc.). 
As expected, the average credit spread at issuance increases monotonically as ratings worsen. It might seem 
surprising that issuers’ of top-rated AAA/Aaa bonds also had higher debt betas and residual volatility 
compared to issuers of bonds with worse ratings. However, the majority of AAA/Aaa bonds (99 out of 132) 
were issued during 2008 and 2009 when systematic risk was abnormally high. 
Panel B of Table 1 shows that the mean credit spread generally declined prior to the crisis but then rose 
from 2006 until 2009. The mean credit rating, equal to the average of Moody’s and S&P’s rating converted 
into a numerical scale (AAA/Aaa = 1, AA+/Aa1 = 2, …, BBB-/Bbb3 = 10), show an opposite trend: the 
mean rating is 6.2 (about A/A2) during 1999 to 2005, while it is about one notch better (A+/A1) from 2006 
through 2010. This pattern presumably reflects a “flight to quality” during the financial crisis when mainly 
high-quality issuers were able to tap debt markets. 
Figure 1 shows the time series evolution of average debt betas of the issuing firms. From a level of 
0.15 in 1999, debt betas steadily drop to 0.01 in years 2005 and 2006 and, then, dramatically increase to 0.22 
in 2009. The rise reflects, in part, that a firm’s debt beta increases as the market value of the firm’s net worth 
declines. This is a consequence of the rise and fall of stock market capitalization and the debt beta equation 
(8): for a given asset volatility and beta (σ and βA, respectively), as a firm’s asset value declines relative to its 
promised debt payments, its debt’s risk becomes closer to that of its assets. That is because a default, after 
                                                     
19 Prior evidence suggests that our pre-issuance method of estimating a bond’s debt beta produces an estimate close to 
that obtained from a post-issuance time series of returns on relatively liquid bonds. Schaefer and Strebulaev (2008) 
regress a corporation’s monthly excess bond return on its excess stock (equity) return and find that the estimated 
sensitivities (coefficients) are similar to what is predicted by the Merton (1974) model on which our approach is based. 
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which debtholders own the firm’s assets, becomes more likely as assets decline. 
3.2. Do Bond Spreads Reflect Systematic Risk after Accounting for Ratings? 
Let us now examine whether spreads on identically-rated bonds reflect differences in systematic risk. 
Since prior studies find that liquidity also affects credit spreads, we generalize equation (7) to:20 
M Dy r PD LGD ipϕ β− = × + × +                                                            (9) 
where ip is an illiquidity premium. Equation (9) motivates our empirical tests. Based on the idea that credit 
ratings primarily reflect real world expected default losses, we proxy PD×LGD by a series of nine dummy 
variables indicating the bond’s issue rating at the notch level.21 In addition to the issuer’s systematic risk as 
proxied by its debt beta, βD, our regressions also include a measure of the debt’s idiosyncratic risk as proxied 
by the log of its debt’s residual volatility. We do this to see whether it is truly systematic risk, rather than the 
debt’s overall risk, that is not accounted for by ratings. 
 Our regressions account for several issue and issuer control variables to proxy for the illiquidity 
premium, ip, as well as other possible factors affecting yields.22 These include the issue’s face value, 
maturity, currency denomination, and the issuer’s country and industry. A detailed description of all control 
variables is reported in Appendix C. In addition, for a subsample of our bonds we estimated another proxy 
for ip, namely, the bond’s average relative bid-ask spread. This was done using bid and ask quotes from 
Bloomberg over the first 60 trading days following the bond’s issuance.23 We were able to obtain these 
quotes for a subsample of 2,395 of the 3,924 total bonds. 
Table 2 Column 1 reports the results of an OLS regression with robust standard errors clustered at both 
the year and the issuer level. It uses the full sample of bonds and shows that rating indicators are all strongly 
significant. The fact that the indicators’ coefficients monotonically increase as the bond’s rating worsens is 
evidence that corporate bond spreads and ratings embed some similar information on default risk. Yet, 
importantly, the coefficient on debt beta is also strongly significant while that of the debt’s idiosyncratic 
                                                     
20 Driessen (2005) estimates an average illiquidity premium of 21 basis points that varies with time and maturity. 
21 These variables are indicators for AA+/Aa1 , …, BBB-/Bbb3, where  AAA/Aaa  is the excluded rating. 
22 For example, credit spreads may be affected by taxes that vary across countries. 
23 The relative bid-ask spread is computed as 100×(Bid-Ask)/[½(Bid+Ask)]. Daily observations were deleted if the bid-
ask spread was zero or negative. See Chordia et al. (2005) and Goyenco and Ukhov (2009). 
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volatility is not.24 The debt beta coefficient of 105.4 implies that a one standard deviation increase in an 
issuer’s debt beta of 0.136 raises the bond’s credit spread by 14.3 bps. Since the regression’s credit rating 
dummies imply that a worsening of one notch raises the credit spread by 15.7 bps, on average, this one-
standard deviation higher debt beta impacts the spread only slightly less than would a notch downgrade. 
Column 2 shows the results are robust to year-by-year Fama-MacBeth regressions, which effectively 
account for rating-by-time fixed effects. While the magnitudes of most coefficients are reduced, the effect of 
debt beta continues to be highly significant. Columns 3 and 4 report regressions similar to those in Columns 
1 and 2, respectively, but using the subsample of bonds for which we could compute bid-ask spreads. The 
bid-ask spread is statistically significant, consistent with the presence of an illiquidity premium in bond 
spreads. Yet, the coefficient on debt beta continues to be significantly positive, and its magnitude is a bit 
larger than in the previous regressions.25 
3.3. Data and Variables on Syndicated Loans 
We use Loan Pricing Corporation’s (LPC) DealScan database to investigate the effect of a borrowing 
firm’s debt beta on the spread it pays on its loans at the time of the loan origination. DealScan reports each 
loan’s type (e.g., term loan or credit line), purpose (e.g., working capital, merger and acquisition), origination 
amount, origination date, maturity date, and the loan’s interest rate spread over LIBOR. 
The DealScan data is complemented with the loan’s rating from Moody’s and, if unavailable, the 
loan’s S&P rating. Similar to the procedure described in Section 3.1 and Appendix B, a borrower’s debt beta 
and debt residual volatility is computed using data from Compustat and the Center for Research on Securities 
Prices (CRSP) database. Use of information on each borrower’s stock price restricts our analysis to publicly-
listed firms. 
After we merge these datasets we are left with a sample of 3,115 rated loans taken out by 918 
corporations over the period 1995-2012. Table 3 provides summary statistics for this sample of loans.  In 
contrast to the previous sample of international bonds, the majority of the syndicated loan sample is rated 
below investment grade, with an average rating of BB/Ba. In addition, the average credit spread is 224 basis 
points, as opposed to 115 basis points for the bond sample.  The average maturity of 5.15 years is also 
                                                     
24 The idiosyncratic volatility of the issuer’s debt is insignificant presumably because it is fully captured by credit 
ratings. Indeed, in unreported results, we find that the coefficient of debt residual volatility becomes significant when 
rating dummies are excluded from the regression. 
25 Our findings are robust to regressions that use only Moody’s or only S&P ratings. Results are available upon request. 
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shorter than the mean 8.02 years for bonds. The borrowing firms’ mean debt beta of 0.14 is higher than the 
0.10 found for bonds. Yet as shown in Figure 2, the time series pattern for mean debt beta is similar by 
declining to a trough in 2005-2007 and reaching a peak in 2009. 
3.4. Do Loan Spreads Reflect Systematic Risk after Accounting for Ratings? 
To see whether syndicated loan credit spreads contain a systematic risk premium not accounted for by 
credit ratings, we rerun regression equation (9) using syndicated loan spreads as the dependent variable. We 
control for a set of loan characteristics, including size, maturity, loan purpose, credit type (e.g., credit line 
versus term loan), covenants, collateralization, and its credit rating. These controls are listed in Appendix C. 
Since there are relatively few syndicated loans rated A or above, we include AAA- AA- and A-rated loans as 
a single rating category and create rating dummy variables at the whole letter level.26  
The regression results are reported in Table 4 and have some similarities to those for corporate bond 
spreads reported in Table 2. Table 4’s Columns 1 and 2 report regressions with robust standard errors 
clustered at the year and issuer level while Columns 3 and 4 report year-by-year Fama-MacBeth regression 
results. In both types of regressions, loan credit spreads tend to be higher as credit ratings worsen. Yet credit 
ratings do not fully account for the borrower’s systematic risk since the coefficient on debt beta is positive 
and significant in all of the regressions. Moreover, the magnitude of the debt beta coefficient is similar to 
that found for corporate bond spreads. One difference with loans is that their credit ratings appear to not fully 
account for the idiosyncratic risk of default. The results in Columns 2 and 4 show that when regressions 
include the log of residual volatility of the borrower’s debt, it is also positively related to loan credit spreads. 
In summary, syndicated loan spreads increase as credit ratings worsen. As with bonds, credit ratings 
fail to fully account for a spread’s systematic risk premium as proxied by the borrower’s debt beta. In 
addition, it appears that syndicated loan credit ratings fail to fully account for borrowers’ idiosyncratic risks 
reflected in loan spreads, perhaps because idiosyncratic risks tend to be large and hard to estimate by rating 
agencies for the relatively credit-risky firms that borrow in the syndicated loan market. 
3.5. Do Credit Ratings Reflect Any Systematic Risk of Issuers?  
While not critical to our model’s assumption that credit ratings fail to account for all of the systematic 
                                                     
26 Including dummy variables for ratings at the notch level leads to many insignificant coefficients for rating notch 
dummies at the AA and A levels due to few observations. However, the effects of the coefficients on debt beta and debt 
residual volatility are virtually unchanged. Results are available upon request. 
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risk reflected in credit spreads, this section investigates whether bond and syndicated loan ratings reflect any 
systematic risk. In particular, we examine whether an issuer’s systematic risk can explain its bonds’ and 
loans’ ratings. Our main dependent variable in regressions is a bond or loan rating converted to a numerical 
scale (AAA/Aaa = 1, AA+/Aa1 = 2, …, BBB-/Bbb3 = 10). For a bond, we use the average of Moody’s and 
S&P’s ratings while for a syndicated loan we use its Moody’s rating except when it is unavailable, in which 
case we use the S&P loan rating.27 
The regressions’ explanatory variables include the issuer’s debt beta, the log of its debt’s residual 
volatility, as well as control variables for the characteristics of the bond or loan. We run regressions with 
standard errors clustered at the year and issuer level as well as year-by-year Fama MacBeth regressions. 
Since use of a numerical scale for the rating implicitly assumes that ratings are cardinal measures so that risk 
differences between rating classes are the same, we also run an ordered probit regression for the loan or bond 
rating using the same explanatory variables. The results are reported in Table 5. 
Panel A of Table 5 presents results for corporate bond ratings. Column 1 shows that debt beta is a 
significant predictor of a bond’s rating when the debt’s log of residual volatility is excluded. However, 
Column 2 shows that debt beta becomes insignificant when this proxy for idiosyncratic risk is included. 
Columns 3 and 4 repeat the same specifications used in Columns 1 and 2, respectively, but use the Fama-
MacBeth regression method. As Column 4 shows, when debt beta and residual volatility are jointly included, 
debt beta is marginally significant (at the 10% level).28 Both debt beta and residual volatility are positive and 
significant when an ordered probit regression is run. 
Table 5’s Panel B reports the results of similar tests using syndicated loan ratings. In regressions where 
debt residual volatility is excluded as an explanatory variable, debt beta is positive and statistically 
significant. When we include debt residual volatility, its coefficient is always positive and significant, but the 
coefficient on debt beta is never significant. This finding is robust to all regression specifications, suggesting 
that syndicated loan ratings reflect idiosyncratic risk but not systematic risk.29 
                                                     
27 Our results for bonds are robust to subsamples that use only Moody’s ratings or only S&P ratings. 
28 The economic significance is small. The coefficient of 1.827 implies that a one standard deviation increase in debt 
beta worsens the rating by 0.197 of a notch (=1.827×0.1079). In contrast, the previous section’s results show that a one-
standard deviation increase in debt beta raised the bond spread by about one full notch. 
29 Table 5’s general result that bond and syndicated loan credit ratings fail to incorporate systematic risk is not sensitive 
to the inclusion of control variables in the regressions. Indeed, in regressions where debt residual volatility is included, 
leaving out the control variables leads to a significantly negative relationship between bond and loan ratings and debt 




4. Empirical Evidence of U.S. Banks’ Choice of Systematic Risk  
Having established that credit spreads on bonds and loans incorporate systematic risk premia that are 
not accounted for by the debts’ credit ratings, we now consider whether banks actually exploit this 
phenomenon to engage in regulatory arbitrage. Our model predicts that low charter value banks choose low 
capital levels and assets with relatively high systematic risk. We consider two tests to investigate this 
prediction. The first test focuses on individual banks’ selection of syndicated loans over the period 1995 to 
2010. It analyzes whether low-capitalized banks select syndicated loans with more systematic risk than the 
loans chosen by high-capitalized banks. The second test goes beyond an investigation of individual 
syndicated loans and examines the systematic risk of a bank’s total assets. It uses model-implied estimates of 
individual banks’ asset return betas and charter values over the period 2001 to 2014. This test analyzes 
whether low charter value banks chose asset portfolios with relatively high systematic risk. 
Since both tests focus on U.S. banks, we need to consider the nature of U.S. risk-based bank 
regulations, and specifically ratings-based bank regulations, during our sample period. To that end, the next 
section discusses the history of risk-based deposit insurance and the record of risk-based capital regulations. 
4.1. Risk-Based Regulation of U.S. Banks  
To a large extent, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) premiums have been unrelated to an 
individual bank’s risk. Rather, the FDIC has mostly adjusted the aggregate level of insurance premiums to 
target its Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) reserves, a policy that is inconsistent with setting fair premia 
(Pennacchi (1999)). Indeed, because reserves were above the DIF target from 1996 to 2006, over 90% of 
banks were charged a zero premium during this period. FDIC premiums were adjusted to cover DIF losses 
due to over 400 bank failures from 2007 to 2012, and in 2011 the FDIC’s method for setting premiums was 
revised. Under the new method, the average level of premiums is still set to target DIF reserves, but 
individual banks’ assessments may also reflect their real-world (physical) expected default losses. However, 
premiums do not penalize systematic risk by reflecting risk-neutral expected losses.30 
The first formal risk-based capital standards for U.S. banks were implemented in 1992 in compliance 
                                                     
30 See Federal Register 76 (38) February 25, 2011 which amends the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to comply with the 
Dodd-Frank Act. An underlying principle for setting premiums (assessments) is stated on page 10700: “Under the FDI 
(Federal Deposit Insurance) Act, the FDIC’s Board of Directors must establish a risk-based assessment system so that a 
depository institution’s deposit insurance assessment is calculated based on the probability that the DIF (Deposit 
Insurance Fund) will incur a loss with respect to the institution.” The FDIC’s statistical failure probability models, on 
which its premium schedule is based, use physical, rather than risk-neutral, probabilities of bank failures. 
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with the Basel I Accord. Basel I set minimum capital requirements based on a bank’s risk-weighted assets, 
but risk-weights were the same over very broad asset classes, such as all corporate bonds and loans. A 1996 
Amendment to Incorporate Market Risks set capital standards for a large bank’s securities held in its “trading 
book.” These standards are calculated from a bank’s internal VaR model that is primary based on an 
estimated real-world distribution of security losses, rather than a risk-neutral one. Moreover, there is 
evidence that some banks used external credit ratings to calibrate their internal VaR models.31 In 2001, MBS 
and ABS securities held in a bank’s “banking book” became subject to capital requirements tied to the 
securities’ external credit ratings. MBS and ABS tranches rated AAA to AA-, A+ to A-, BBB+ to BBB-, and 
BB+ to BB- were assigned risk weights of 20%, 50%, 100%, and 200%, respectively. 
Large U.S. banks were scheduled to be subject to Basel II capital standards starting in April 2008. 
However, the financial crisis starting in 2007 delayed its implementation, and these banks eventually 
transitioned from Basel I to the Basel III Internal Ratings-Based Approach (IRB) in January 2014.32 Under 
the IRB approach, credit risk capital charges are based on internal ratings generated from the single risk 
factor portfolio model analyzed in Gordy (2003). Inputs into the capital charge formula are the bank’s own 
estimates of its bonds’ and loans’ physical probabilities of default (PD) and losses given default (LGD).33 
The Basel formula then converts these physical inputs into their hypothetical risk-neutral counterparts using 
an assumed beta or market correlation for each asset class.34 Importantly, this assumed beta (correlation) is 
not chosen by the bank but is set by Basel IRB rules and is essentially the same across very broad asset 
                                                     
31 For example, in 2008 the Swiss Federal Banking Commission required that UBS report the key causes of its severe 
losses. UBS’s report to shareholders (UBS, 2008) states that external credit ratings helped determine “the relevant 
product-type time series to be used in calculating VaR” (p. 20). Moreover, an over-reliance on credit ratings, which 
appears to be common in large banks, was found to be a primary cause of UBS’s losses as “a comprehensive analysis of 
the portfolios may have indicated that the positions would necessarily perform consistent with their ratings” (p. 39). 
RiskMetrics also sometimes advocates basing VaR calculations on an issuer’s rating. As stated in Mina and Xiao (2001, 
p.42) “For example, in marking-to-market a cash flow from an instrument issued by the U.S. Treasury, Treasury rates 
will be used, while for a cash flow from a Aa-rated financial corporate bond, the financial corporate Aa zero rate curve 
will be a good choice if a firm-specific zero rate curve is not available.” 
32 IRB rules require sufficient initial capital, K0, such that there is no more than a 0.1% physical probability of losses 
exceeding this initial capital over a one-year horizon. Credit risk weights for small U.S. banks remain the same as Basel 
I, with the exception MBS and ABS securities which have risk weights based on a “Simplified Supervisory Formula” 
described in http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/basel/files/capital_rule_community_bank_guide_20130709.pdf  
33 There is a “Foundation” IRB approach where LGD is fixed for corporate claims. For example, it is 45% for all senior, 
unsecured bonds and loans. Under the “Advanced” IRB approach, guidelines recommend that banks estimate a bond or 
loan’s “downturn” LGD which reflects losses that are expected to occur if default happens during an economic 
downturn. In principle, use of downturn LGDs may differentiate between high and low systematic risk claims, but since 
PDs are not conditioned on a downturn, the VaR capital requirement is unlikely to fully incorporate systematic risk.  
34 Since 
,, , /i Mi D i A i Mρ σω β σ= , where ρi,M is the correlation between the market risk factor and the asset class i’s return, 
an assumption regarding the correlation ρi,M  essentially is an assumption regarding the asset class’s debt beta. 
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classes.35 Hence, within an asset class, such as all corporate claims, there is no ability to differentiate 
between high and low systematic default risk for debt securities having the same PD×LGD. 
Banks appear to have adjusted their business models in response to changes in the Basel II and III IRB 
rules well before they were scheduled to be implemented.36 Moreover, while not formally part of risk-based 
capital rules, U.S. bank examiners have used external credit ratings to judge the risk of banks’ holdings of 
securities. Harold (1938, p.25) reports that examiners at several different Federal Reserve banks evaluate 
their member banks’ bond portfolios using a method devised by Gustav Osterhus of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York. This method, detailed in Osterhus (1931), is a value-weighted average of external credit 
ratings converted to a numerical scale. Moreover, the Shared National Credit Program was created in 1977 to 
ensure that examiners by the three Federal banking regulators (Comptroller of the Currency, Federal 
Reserve, and FDIC) use a consistent regulatory credit rating for each syndicated loan that was held by 
multiple banks. Each loan was reviewed annually and given a rating by one of these regulators (FDIC 2004, 
3.2-63). In addition, examiners would not give an adverse classification rating to any security that had an 
investment-grade external credit rating, unless the rating was stale (FDIC, 2004, 3.3-11). 
In summary, there is ample evidence that regulators used credit ratings to evaluate bank risk, either 
formally or informally, for many decades. These ratings may have been set by external credit rating agencies, 
banks using internal VaR models, or the regulators themselves, but they share the general feature of being 
based on real-world (physical), rather than risk-neutral, expected default losses. Consequently, our empirical 
tests assume that banks were subject to ratings-based regulation throughout our sample periods.  
4.2. Banks’ Choice of Systematic Risk: Testable Hypotheses  
Our model in Section 2 predicts that ratings-based regulation gives banks with low charter value an 
incentive to minimize capital and invest in assets with the highest systematic risk; that is, they choose βmax 
and Kmin(βmax). An implication is that a bank’s choice of systematic risk should be inversely related to its 
capital ratio and also inversely related to its charter value. For the set of regression equations 
                                                     
35 The formula for assigning correlation values is the same for broad classes of corporate bonds and loans. These values 
can vary between 8% and 24%, but the variation is a function only of the borrowing firm’s annual sales (greater for 
firms with more than €50 million in sales) and the bank’s estimated physical PD, where correlation is higher for lower 
PDs. See BCBS (2005). Fitch Ratings (2008) finds no empirical support for the IRB rule’s inverse relationship between 
PDs and portfolio correlation (systematic risk). As will be reported in our empirical work, neither do we find an inverse 
relationship between a firm’s systematic risk (debt beta) and its probability of default (as reflected in its credit rating).   
36 For example, Plosser and Santos (2017) document that US banks began reducing their supply of so called 364-day 
facilities, which were targeted in Basel II, well before June 2004 when the Accord was finalized. 
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, 0 1 , 1 2 , 1 ,i t i t i t i tSystematicRisk Capital Controlsa a a e− −= + + +                               (10) 
, 0 1 , 1 2 , 1 ,   ,i t i t i t i tSystematicRisk a a Charter a Controls h− −= + + +                            (11) 
this prediction implies a1 < 0 and a1< 0, where ,i tSystematicRisk is the systematic risk of bank i’s 
investments, ,i tCapital is bank i’s capital ratio, and ,i tCharter is bank i’s charter value per deposit. 
Our tests use both regression specifications due to the following tradeoffs. While equation (11) links 
systematic risk directly to charter value, charter value is not easily observable. Our method for estimating a 
bank’s charter value, as well as the systematic risk of the bank’s total assets, requires that the bank has both 
publicly-traded stock and CDS contracts. In contrast, our tests using capital ratios in equation (10) utilize a 
larger sample of banks that invest in syndicated loans. In this case, however, a bank’s choice of systematic 
risk is based solely on its selection of different syndicated loans. We start with this case that uses regression 
(10), followed by a test based on equation (11) that examines banks’ systematic risk of total assets.  
4.3. Banks’ Choice of Syndicated Loan Systematic Risk  
To investigate how a bank’s selection of systematic risk relates to its capital ratio, we use two 
different measures of the systematic risk of the syndicated loans chosen by a bank at the end of the year that 
the loans were originated. The first measure is the weighted average of the debt betas of the borrowers to 
whom the bank granted syndicated loans, using the relative size of the bank’s investment in each loan as 
weights. The second measure is motivated by the observation that the more systematically-risky loans of a 
given credit rating will have a higher spread. Accordingly, we calculate a weighted average excess spread on 
the bank’s portfolio of loans instead of the weighted average of the debt betas of the bank’s borrowers. 
The weighted average excess spread is computed as follows. First, we calculate for each loan rating 
the weighted average spread of the new loans issued each year, with the weights determined by the size of 
the loan relative to all the loans issued in the year with the same rating. Next, we compute the excess spread 
for each loan as the difference between the spread on the loan and the weighted average spread of the loans 
with the same rating issued in that year. Finally, to calculate the weighted excess spread of the new loans 
chosen by a given bank during a particular year, we weight these excess spreads using the relative size of the 
bank’s investment in each loan as weights. 
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4.3.1 Data Information on banks’ holdings of syndicated loans comes from the Shared National 
Credit (SNC) program run by the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency. The SNC program gathers confidential data on new and existing credits 
that exceed $20 million and are held by three or more federally-supervised institutions. As with DealScan, 
the SNC data contains information about the loan, including its size, maturity, purpose, credit type, 
origination and maturity date. In contrast to DealScan, the SNC data does not contain information on the loan 
interest rate, but, and importantly for our purposes, it contains complete information about the loan 
syndicate, including the share of the loan owned by the lead banks and the other participants.37 These loan 
shares correspond to each bank’s loan holding as of the last day of each calendar year. Our second source of 
data is Federal Reserve Y9-C reports of individual bank holding company consolidated financial statements. 
This information provides each bank’s Tier I capital ratio and its total asset size. 
 After we merge datasets and require that information on each loan is recorded in SNC during the 
loan’s origination year, that each loan’s spread is available in DealScan, that the loan is rated, and that 
financial statement information is available on each bank investing in the loan, we are left with 5,046 loan-
bank observations. They correspond to 739 loans made by 165 different bank holding companies. After 
computing the weighted average excess spread for each bank during a given year, we obtain a total of 1,581 
bank-year observations. To compute the weighted average debt beta for a given bank during a given year, we 
lose some observations due to the requirement that the borrowing firm have publically-traded equity. Thus, 
we are left with 1,177 bank-year observations when using debt beta as the systematic risk measure. 
 4.3.2 Results The two systematic risk measures for each bank are regressed on the bank’s prior-year 
Tier 1 capital ratio, the bank’s size as proxied by the log of total assets, and controls for yearly fixed effects. 
Since a bank faces minimum capital requirements for both its Tier 1 capital to total assets (leverage) ratio 
and its Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets ratio, we consider regressions using these alternative capital 
ratio measures.38  Table 6 Panel A reports results using each bank’s Tier 1 capital to total assets ratio. 
Column 1 shows that the average debt beta of the syndicated loans chosen by a bank increases when its 
capital ratio is lower. Column 2 confirms this behavior even when the sample excludes the 2008 to 2010 
                                                     
37 See Bord and Santos (2012) for a detailed comparison between these two loan databases. 
38 Acharya, Engle, and Pierret (2014) find that the Tier 1 capital to total assets measure has higher correlation with 
market measures of risk. On the other hand, the Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets measure may be more relevant for 
our model that predicts low charter value banks will choose a binding capital to risk-weighted assets ratio. 
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crisis years. Moreover, the economic size of this effect is meaningful. For example, a one-standard deviation 
lower Tier 1 bank capital ratio of 2.02% of assets raises the average debt beta of the bank’s syndicated loans 
by -2.02×(-0.0083) = 0.016. Given that the sample banks’ weighted-average debt beta has a mean of 0.122, 
the lower capital leads to a 13.7% increase in systematic risk. 
 Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 Panel A report similar regressions but where the dependent variable is 
the average excess spread of the syndicated loans chosen by a bank. Consistent with the choice of higher 
debt beta, lower capital banks “reach for yield” by choosing syndicated loans with relatively high spreads 
given the loans’ credit ratings. This reaching for yield behavior is present even when the 2008 to 2010 crisis 
years are excluded. As a robustness check, columns 5 and 6 repeat the regressions using a bank’s choice of 
average excess loan spreads as the dependent variable, but restricting the sample to those loans for which the 
borrowing firm’s debt beta could be calculated, which is the same sample used in the regressions reported in 
columns 1 and 2. In this case, lower capitalization has even a stronger effect on reaching for yield behavior. 
Overall, the coefficient estimates imply that a one standard deviation lower capital ratio raises a bank’s 
credit-rating adjusted syndicated loan spreads by about 5 basis points. 
 Panel B of Table 6 repeats the same regressions as in Panel A but where each bank’s capital ratio is 
its Tier 1 capital divided by risk-weighted assets. Using this alternative capital ratio measure produces no 
qualitative differences and hardly any quantitative differences. The only exception is for the excess spread 
regression using the whole sample, which is reported in column 3. There one sees that a lower ratio of capital 
to risk-weighted assets leads to a rise in the excess spread on syndicated loans that is twice the magnitude as 
that when the ratio of capital to total assets was used.   
 Note also that the results in Table 6 suggest that, ceteris paribus, a bank’s choice of systematic risk 
declines with bank size. Yet evidence that banks with low capital choose loans with higher debt betas and 
credit-rating adjusted spreads is strong and robust to different capital ratio measures. This behavior accords 
with our model’s prediction that low charter value banks choose low capital and high systematic risk.  
4.4. Banks’ Choice of Asset Systematic Risk  
A limitation of the previous tests is that they consider only the syndicated loan portion of the bank’s 
assets. To address this concern, in this section we examine a bank’s choice of systematic risk at the level of 
its total asset portfolio. Each bank’s asset systematic risk is related to its charter value using the regression 
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equation (11). Estimates of a bank’s asset systematic risk, βA, and charter value per deposit, C/D0, are those 
implied by our model in Section 2 and are inferred from data on each bank’s value, volatility, and beta of 
shareholders’ equity, as well as the CDS spread on its debt. The estimation methodology is similar to that 
detailed in Appendix B for nonbank corporations, but is now extended to three main equations instead of 
two. The first is the bank’s market value of equity in equation (6) which can be rewritten as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )0 0 1 2 2rT pT rTTE A N d e D e N d e CN d− −= − + .                                         (12) 
The second equation is the volatility of the return on equity: 
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The third equation expresses a CDS spread, SCDS, as approximately equal to a default-risky credit spread:39 
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Note that the market value and volatility of equity in equations (12) and (13) are functions of the 
bank’s tangible assets, A0, and its charter value, C. However, the bank’s CDS spread in equation (14) 
depends only on tangible assets since charter value, by definition, is lost if the bank fails and defaults. This 
“exclusion restriction” helps us identify C from A0. Since equations (12) to (14) are functions of C, A0, and 
the volatility of asset returns, σ, we can estimate these three variables given that all other variables in this 
nonlinear system are observable. Once we obtain values for C, A0, and σ, as well as an estimate of the bank’s 
stock return beta, βE, an extension of Galai and Masulis (1979) allows us to estimate the bank’s asset return 
beta, βA, as:40  
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39 See Bomfim (2016) page 73 for a no-arbitrage argument that derives this result. 
40 At first glance, equation (15) might appear to impart a mechanical negative relationship between our estimate of asset 
systematic risk, βA, and charter value, C, because C appears in the denominator of the right-hand side of the equation. 
But that is not the case. Each bank-quarter estimate of βA is based on the bank-quarter’s unique values of E0, σE, and, 
SCDS, which in turn produce unique bank-quarter values of C, A0, and σ using equations (12) to (14). Thus, C cannot be 
considered fixed but, rather, is a function of several other variables: ( )0 0, , , ,E CDSC C E S Aσ σ= . Equivalently, from 
an inverse-function perspective, note that equation (12) implies that E0 in the numerator of equation (15) is a positive 
function of C, so C appears in both the numerator and denominator of equation (15). 
 
26 
 4.4.1 Data and Variables We implement this estimation using quarterly data on U.S. bank holding 
companies that had both publicly-traded shareholders’ equity and CDS contracts over the period from 
2001Q4 to 2014Q4. Market values of banks’ shareholders’ equity and stock returns were obtained from the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and end-of-quarter CDS spreads and estimated default 
recovery values are from IHS Markit.41 Quarterly bank holding company balance sheet data is from Federal 
Reserve Y-9C reports. After merging this data we obtain 1,059 bank-quarter observations representing 33 
different bank holding companies.42 The estimation procedure outlined in the previous section is 
implemented to obtain each bank’s asset return beta, βA, and charter value per book-value of debt (deposits), 
C/D0. More details of this estimation are given in the Appendix B. 
Table 7 provides summary statistics of our main variables. Panel A includes all 33 bank holding 
companies. It shows that the mean asset return beta is 0.17, which seems reasonable for assets that are 
mainly fixed-income securities and is comparable to the mean debt beta that we found in Table 3 for sub-
investment-grade syndicated loans. The mean charter value-to-debt ratio is 4.1%, with a maximum of 17.3% 
and a minimum very close to zero.43 These charter value estimates also seem plausible given the increasing 
level of competition from the deregulation of bank branching and the rise of nonbank competitors, such as 
money market funds.44  
Seven of our sample’s financial institutions became holding companies only during the recent 
financial crisis or were non-traditional banks in that their main subsidiaries were not commercial banks or 
thrift institutions.45 Thus, Panel B of Table 7 examines a subsample of 25 holding companies whose main 
subsidiary is a traditional bank. The summary statistics for this subsample are not much different, with the 
mean asset return beta being slightly smaller at 0.16 and the mean charter value-to-debt ratio being almost 
                                                     
41 We use the spread on a 5-year CDS contract written on senior, unsecured debt. 
42 Note that there is approximately 8 years of quarterly data per holding company over this 14-year period. Several 
banks failed or were distressed acquisitions during 2008, including Washington Mutual, Wachovia, and National City.  
43 Our method of measuring charter value produces a lower average estimate than the method of Demsetz, Saidenberg, 
and Strahan (1996) and Boyson, Fahlenbrach, and Stulz (2016), which equals the sum of the bank’s market value of 
equity plus book value of debt divided the book value of assets. Using their method, we find an average charter value to 
book asset ratio of 6.3% while our method’s average, normalized by book assets rather than debt, is 3.9%. The 
correlation between these two methods’ estimates is 0.28. We expect that our method would produce lower estimates 
because it accounts for the fact that the bank’s market equity value reflects not only charter value but also a deposit 
insurance subsidy. It also does not assume that the market value of tangible assets equals the book value of assets. 
44 For example, data from the Investment Company Institute and FDIC show that the ratio of money market fund assets 
to total bank deposits was 5.1%, 18.8%, 44.1%, and 47.4% in 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2008, respectively.  




identical at 4.1%. 
4.4.2 Results Table 8 reports the results of using this data with regression equation (11) where the 
dependent variable is quarterly observations of banks’ asset return beta, βA. The explanatory variable of 
interest is each bank’s ratio of charter value-to-debt. The regressions also include controls for bank size (log 
of total assets) and a measure of the bank’s equity capital ratio. Columns (1) to (3) examine the subsample of 
only those 25 bank holding companies that have a traditional bank as their main subsidiary, and it uses each 
bank’s Tier 1 capital-to-total assets ratio as the capital ratio control. Column (1) presents regression results 
without any fixed effects, and its findings are consistent with the model prediction that banks with relatively 
low charter value have assets with significantly higher systematic risk. Column (2) shows results that control 
for bank fixed effects, which is a sensible adjustment since our sample ranges from small regional banks to 
large money-center banks. These banks have different business models that may lead to partly involuntary 
differences in systematic risk. The results with this control indicate an even stronger negative effect of 
charter value on a bank’s choice of systematic risk. 
The results are similar when we control for both bank and time (quarter) fixed effects. As shown in 
Column (3), the coefficient of -0.470 on charter value is statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. 
This point estimate is also economically significant. A one-standard deviation decline in charter value would 
raise a bank’s asset beta by 0.470×0.0476=0.0224. Relative to the average bank asset beta of 0.1578, this 
represents an asset beta increase to 0.1802, a rise of 14.2 %. Of course higher asset betas imply more 
correlated asset returns, which could significantly raise the likelihood of simultaneous bank failures during 
an economic downturn. For example, if individual banks each had an unconditional probability of failure 
equal to 3% and asset betas of 0.1578, the Vasicek (2002) portfolio model predicts that with 0.1% 
probability no more than 8.0% of banks would fail.46 Instead, if the banks’ asset betas equaled 0.1802, then 
with 0.1% probability no more than 9.0% of banks would fail. The implication is that at the 0.1% probability 
tail of the distribution, banks’ higher systematic risk would increase the bank failure rate by 12.5%. 
Column (4) considers the entire sample that includes bank holding companies whose main subsidiary 
is not a traditional bank. Here we use the equity capital to total asset ratio as our control for capitalization 
                                                     
46 This calculation is based on equation (4) in Vasicek (2002). Let p be the unconditional probability that any single 
bank fails, and let βA be banks’ asset beta. Then the probability that the proportion of banks that default, b, is less than x 
equals ( ) ( ) ( )( )2 1 1 21 /A AP b x N N x N pβ β− −≤ = − −   .  
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since not all institutions report Tier 1 capital. The results are very similar to those of the subsample that 
included only traditional banks. There is a strong negative relationship between charter value and systematic 
risk-taking. There also appears to be a positive relationship between capital and systematic risk when we 
control for charter value and bank and time fixed effects. Perhaps if low charter value banks are subject to 
minimum risk-based capital requirements, they need to increase the risk of their assets in order to invest in 
default-risky loans and securities that have high systematic risk. That might explain why capital ratios that 
are not risk-weighted may need to rise. 
To see if the results are robust to excluding the volatile financial crisis years of 2008 and 2009, we run 
regressions excluding all observations in these two years. Table 8 Column 5 reports the regression using only 
traditional banks while Column 6 includes all bank holding companies. The main results are unchanged 
though significance is somewhat weaker for the traditional bank subsample. Overall, these results are 
consistent with our theory which predicts that when a bank’s failure entails relatively little lost charter value, 
the bank is more likely to exploit its government safety net by taking high systematic risk.  
4.5. Equilibrium Implications  
The single bank model in Section 2 could be extended to consider the market structure of the 
banking industry. Keeley (1990) argues that starting in the 1970’s, deregulation and the entry of nonbanks, 
such as money market mutual funds, led to greater competition that reduced banks’ charter values. An 
implication of greater competition is an increase in ratings-based regulatory arbitrage as more banks switch 
from a strategy of protecting their declining charter value to exploiting their deposit insurance subsidy. The 
previous section’s empirical evidence is consistent with this switching given it shows that lower charter 
value raises the systematic risk of a bank’s assets. 
If, for a given credit rating, regulatory arbitrage generates a greater demand for high beta debt, there 
could be a corresponding increase in supply. The growth in highly-rated, but systematically-risky, structured 
securities over the last few decades (Coval, Jurek, and Stafford, 2009) may be an example. Yet with some 
inelasticity in supply, an extraordinary demand for systematically-risky debt has equilibrium pricing 
implications: controlling for rating, the yields on high beta debt would fall relative to the yields on low beta 
debt. The effect in terms of the credit spread equation (9) is a decline in the market price of systematic risk, 
ϕM, commonly referred to as the “equity premium.” 
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The results of our credit spread regressions reported in Tables 2 and 4 provide estimates of ϕM equal 
to the coefficient on debt beta. Depending on the specification, our estimates of ϕM range from 83 to 139 
basis points for bonds and from 42 to 109 basis points for syndicated loans.47 Clearly, these estimates are less 
than the historical excess return on U.S. equities.48 Undoubtedly, one reason for our low estimates is due to 
errors when estimating each issuing firm’s debt beta, βD, which downward biases our estimate of ϕM.49 
However, a low value of ϕM is also consistent with our theory and empirical evidence that ratings-based 
regulation generates an extraordinary demand for high beta debt.50 Note that even if systematic risk-taking is 
not highly rewarded in terms of risk premia, it could be attractive to banks for another reason. By herding 
into a systematically-risky common exposure, banks may increase the likelihood that the government bails 
out the banking industry (Penati and Protopapadakis (1988), Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007)). 
Interestingly, early tests of the CAPM based on a time series of stock returns, such as Black, Jensen, 
and Scholes (1972) and Fama and MacBeth (1973), estimated values for ϕM that were positive but also below 
the historical excess market return. Moreover, tests using more recent stock return data produce even lower 
estimates. Fama and French (1992) estimate that ϕM is essentially zero during 1963 to 1990. Baker, Bradley, 
and Wurgler (2011) show that low beta stocks outperformed high beta stocks over the period 1968 to 2008, 
implying a strictly negative value for ϕM.51 
Several theories have been proposed to explain this extraordinary demand for high beta stocks, 
including restricted borrowing by investors (Black, 1972 and Frazzini and Pedersen, 2014), mutual fund 
                                                     
47 By allowing ϕM to vary over time, our Fama-MacBeth regression estimates indicate that during the 2008-2010 
financial crisis years, it averaged 365 basis points for bonds and 189 basis points for loans.  
48 From 1926 to 2016, the continuously-compounded return on the CRSP value-weighted index in excess of a one-
month Treasury bill return was 5.93%. Another estimate of expected excess stock market returns is available from 
annual forecasts by the Survey of Professional Forecasters. Their 10-year prediction for the return on the S&P500 
versus the 3-month Treasury rate implies equity premiums averaging 3.65% during the 1999 to 2010 period. See 
http://www.phil.frb.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/survey-of-professional-forecasters/ . 
49 As the number of observations increase, the true value of ϕM converges to ( )2 21 /e βσ σ+ times its estimated value, 
where 2eσ is the variance of estimation errors and 
2
βσ  is the variance of the true βD’s. Note that the standard practice 
when estimating ϕM from a time series of stock returns is to sort stocks into portfolios based on their estimated beta in a 
prior period. This method is not applicable to our data that contains a single observation for each bond or loan at the 
date it is issued. 
50 Murray and Nikolova (2017) use a time series of returns on corporate bonds to estimate their betas for an aggregate 
default factor and a default-free term structure factor. Consistent with underpriced systematic risk, they find that debt 
with high term structure betas underperform relative to similarly-rated debt with low term structure betas. Also, 
consistent with insurance company regulation that requires a steep capital charge for sub-investment grade bonds, bonds 
rated marginally investment grade (BBB-) are underpriced relative to higher-rated bonds. 
51 Frazzini and Pedersen (2011) also find a negative reward for bearing systematic risk using several asset classes, 
including 20 international equity markets. 
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managers that exploit investors’ returns-chasing behavior (Karceski, 2002), fixed-benchmark mandates for 
money managers that limit arbitrage (Baker et al. 2011), and investors who disagree but face short-sale 
constraints (Hong and Sraer, 2016). 
Obviously, our theory and empirical evidence for systematic risk-taking is distinctly different. It is 
specific to debt securities held by financial institutions, such as banks and insurance companies, that are 
subject to ratings-based regulation. Our finding of a small but positive reward for systematic risk-taking in 
debt markets contrasts with existing studies that find a negative reward for systematic risk in stock markets 
and suggests some degree of market segmentation. 
  
5. Conclusions 
Our model shows that when bond and loan credit spreads embed systematic default risk premia that are 
absent from these debts’ credit ratings, ratings-based regulation leads low-charter value banks to minimize 
capital and take high systematic risks. A worrisome implication of these choices is that by loading on 
systematic risk, low-capitalized banks become more likely to fail simultaneously during market downturns, 
exacerbating systemic risk. Complementing a previous literature that emphasized the high systematic risk of 
structured securities, we find evidence of economically significant systematic risk in corporate debt: credit 
spreads on identically-rated corporate bonds and loans are significantly higher when their issuers have 
greater systematic default risk. 
We also present direct evidence that systematic moral hazard occurs among U.S. commercial banks. 
First, we show that low-capitalized banks choose syndicated loans with relatively high debt betas and 
relatively high spreads given the loans’ ratings. Second, we derive model-implied estimates of banks’ charter 
values and asset return betas and confirm our model’s prediction that banks with relatively low charter value 
choose assets whose returns have relatively high systematic risk. 
Since 2009, reforms to bank and insurance company capital requirements have concentrated on 
structured securities and largely ignored corporate debt.52 With greater risk weights on structured securities, 
corporate bonds and loans might now be the preferred vehicle for these institutions to engage in regulatory 
arbitrage. Our empirical finding of significant variation in corporate systematic risks shows that there 
                                                     
52 Under Basel III, the Basel Committee (2009) has reformed risk weights for securitizations and raised them for 
resecuritizations (e.g., CDOs) under both the Standardized approach and for the IRB approach. Thus far, Basel III 
recommends no major changes for risk weights on corporate claims relative to the standards set before the crisis. 
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remains scope for exploitation of ratings-based regulation. 
What regulatory reforms might address this moral hazard? One remedy is to reduce the distortions by 
increasing market discipline (Flannery (1998)). When a bank obtains subordinated funding from investors 
who are not de jure or de facto insured by a government, the uninsured debt’s credit spread should account 
for the bank’s systematic risk and act as a deterrent.53 In turn, regulatory capital requirements and 
supervisory actions might better respond to systematic risk if they were linked to the credit spreads or credit 
default swap spreads of the bank’s uninsured debt, as Hart and Zingales (2011) advocate. Finally, more 
emphasis on setting capital requirements based on the outcome of stress tests is a welcomed development.54 
By focusing on performance during severe economic downturns, the most systematically risky banks might 
be targeted for greater required capital.
                                                     
53 In our model if an intermediary issued uninsured debt, its credit spread, p, would satisfy the fair standard equation 
(3). One approach to implement greater market discipline would be to narrow the scope of activities that could be 
funded by insured liabilities. Non-qualifying activities would need to be funded with uninsured funds in separate 
subsidiaries or separate firms. Examples of this approach are the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act’s “Volker Rule” that bars 
proprietary trading by banks, the 2011 U.K. Independent Commission on Banking’s (Vickers) proposal to restrict 
deposit-insured banks to “ring-fenced” retail and payments-related activities, and the 2012 European Commission High-
Level Expert Group (Liikanen) Report’s proposal to restrict propriety trading and other risky activities non-bank, 
uninsured subsidiaries. 
54 Examples include the U.S.’s Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) and the European Central Bank’s 
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APPENDIX A – Model Details 
Return on Bank Assets: The model in Section 2 considers a bank whose assets are a fixed-income portfolio 
composed of corporate debt issued by many different firms. Each firm’s capital structure satisfies the model 
of Merton (1974). Specifically, if firm i has date t assets worth Ai,t and issues of a single zero-coupon bond or 
loan that promises to pay Xi in τi periods, then the date t value of firm i’s debt, Di,t , equals 
( ) ( ), , 1, 2,iri t i t i i iD A N d X e N dτ−= − +                                              (A1)            
where ( ) ( ) ( )211, , 2ln / /i i t i i i i id A X r σ τ σ τ = + +  , 2, 1,i i i id d σ τ= − , and σi is the volatility of the 
return on firm i’s assets.  The standard deviation of the return on this default risky debt, σ d,i(τi), equals 
( ) ( ) ,, 1,
,
i t





σ τ σ= −                                                  (A2) 
which changes over time.  However, the bank is assumed to hold the risky debt of other firms in the same 
industry that have assets driven by the same Brownian motion as that of firm i, say dzi. By buying and selling 
bonds of industry i firms and/or making new loans and not renewing maturing loans to those firms, the bank 
can keep its total assets’ relative exposure to this industry constant, equal to σA,i. For example, if the average 
volatility of the debt of industry i held by the bank equals iσ and its total asset portfolio weight to industry 
i’s debt is ωi, then the bank adjusts ωi and iσ to keep ,A i i iσ ωσ=  constant. If it holds debt of firms in m 
different industries, the bank’s re-balancing implies that its total assets satisfy equation (1) in the text. 
Maintaining the Merton (1974) assumptions and also assuming there is a single priced risk factor 
consistent with the CAPM, let the economy’s stochastic discount factor be of the form dMt/Mt  = -rdt - 
θdzM.55 Then the expected rate of return on the bank’s total asset portfolio is 
, ,1
m
A i i Mi
rm θ σ ρ
=
= + ∑                                                             (A3) 
where dzidzM = ρi,Mdt and θ  = ϕM/σM is the Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio, equal to the expected excess 
return on the market portfolio, ϕM, divided by the market portfolio’s standard deviation of return, σM. Thus, 
from equation (A3), the bank portfolio’s expected rate of return equals equation (2) in the text where βD,i = 
                                                     




, /i M i M Mσ σ ρ σ is the debt beta of the average firm in industry i. 
Value of Bank Shareholders’ Equity: The date 0 value of the date T payoff to equity in equation (5) is 
analogous to a call option written on the bank’s tangible assets, A0=D0+K0, with an exercise price of pTTD e
( )
0
dr p TD e += , plus the discounted future charter value times the risk-neutral probability of not defaulting: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0 0 0 1 2 2





E K D N d e D e N d e CN d
K D K D N d e D e N d e CN d
− −
− −
= + − +
= + − + − − +
                 (A4) 
Adding and subtracting the value of premiums, ( ) ( ) ( )01 1dr r TrT pT pTTe D e D e e− −− − = − , from the right-hand-
side of (A4) and re-arranging terms we obtain: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
0 0 2 0 0 1
0 2
1
       1 d
rT pT rT pT
T T
r r T rT
E K e D e N d K D N d e D e
D e e CN d
− −
− − −
= + − − + − − −
+ − +
                 (A5) 
By noting that the second and third terms on the right-hand-side of (A5) equal the value of a put option 
written on bank assets with an exercise price of DTepT, we obtain equation (6) in the text. Now note that 
( )( )0 1 dr r TD e− −− is the one-period value of being able to issue deposits at the below-competitive rate rd, rather 
than the competitive rate r. The date T value of continuing to issue the amount D0 of deposits at rate rd for all 
future periods of length T starting at date T is  
( )( ) ( )( )0 00 11 1 1
d dr r T r r TrT i
rTi
C D e e D e
e
∞− − − −− ×
−=
= − = −
−∑                                  (A6) 
Proof of Proposition: The bank is assumed to maximize shareholders’ equity in excess of shareholders’ 
contributed capital, E0 –K0, which is equation (6) and equals the value of the bank’s deposit insurance 
subsidy plus the present value of its charter. The bank chooses K0 and β subject to the constraints Kmin (β) ≤ 
K0 ≤ Kmax and βmin ≤ β ≤ βmax where Kmin (β) satisfies the credit rating-based minimum capital requirement in 
(4). Note that in (4), Kmin and β appear only through the term ( ) ( )min 0 M B TK D eϕ β −+ , so that when (4) is 
satisfied, we have ( )min min 0/ 0MdK d T K Dβ ϕ= − + < , implying that ( )minK β is minimized at β = βmax. 




( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
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  (A7) 
and the first order conditions are 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 0 0 1 2
0
/ 0 ,rTL N d e Cn d K D T
K
σ λλ−∂  = − − + + + = ∂
−                       (A.8) 
 
( ) ( )( )min2 3 4 2 min 0 3 4 0 ,M
KL T K D
β
λ λ λ λ ϕ β λ λ
β β
∂∂
= − − + = + − + =
∂ ∂
                   (A.9) 
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and ∂2L/∂K0∂β = 0.  Note from the right-hand side of (A.8) that the first term is ( )1N d− − < 0 and the second 
term is ( ) ( )2 0 0/rTe Cn d K D Tσ− +   > 0. Suppose that there exists an interior K0 that satisfies (A.8) 
whereby these two terms are equal in magnitude and, therefore, λ1 = λ2 = 0. Substituting N(-d1) for 
( ) ( )2 0 0/rTe Cn d K D Tσ− +   in (A.10) leads to ( ) ( )[ ] ( )0 0
2 2
0 1 1 1 // K D TL K n d d N d σ+∂ ∂ = − −    > 0 
since n(x) > xN(-x).56 Thus, with a positive second derivative, any interior solution for K0 must be a 
minimum. Consequently, the choice of K0 that maximizes excess shareholder value must occur at one of the 
endpoints, Kmin or Kmax. 
Given that any interior solution is a minimum, from (A.8) a necessary condition for K0 = Kmin to be 
the global maximum is that ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )0 min2 1 2 0 0/ |rT K KN d e Cn d K D T βλ σ− == − − +   > 0 and λ1 = 0. 
Moreover, with λ2 > 0, the first order condition (A.9) implies ( )( )3 2 min 0MT K Dλλ ϕ β= + > 0 and λ4 = 0, so 
that β = βmax binds. Consequently, if the global maximum of excess shareholder value is at the minimum 
level of capital, then K0 = Kmin(βmax). In other words, the bank will also choose the highest systematic risk. 
                                                     
56 For example, see formula 26.2.12 on page 932 of Abramowitz and Stegun (1972). 
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Alternatively, if the global maximum is at K0 = Kmax, then from (A.8) a necessary condition is 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) 0 max1 2 0 0 1/ |rT K Ke Cn d K D T N dλ σ− == + − −   > 0 and λ2 = 0. With λ2 = 0, the first order condition 
(A.9) implies that bank’s choice of β is indeterminate. This makes sense since E0 –K0 is independent of β 
when K0 = Kmax since the minimum capital constraint in (4) does not bind. 
If both K0 = Kmin(βmax) and K0 = Kmax satisfy the above necessary conditions for a maximum, which 
would occur when there is an interior minimum, then determining the global maximum requires using 
equation (6) to compare ( ) ( )0 min max0 0 |K KE K β=− versus ( ) 0 max0 0 |K KE K =− , where the larger is the global 
maximum. Based on (A.7), (A.8), and our above arguments, note that if (r-rd) is sufficiently small so that C 
is sufficiently close to 0, K0 = Kmin(βmax) must be the global maximum. Instead, if (r-rd) and C are sufficiently 
large, K0 = Kmax must be the global maximum. 
 
APPENDIX B – Estimation Details 
Calculation of Issuing Firms’ Debt Betas: Following Galai and Masulis (1976) and consistent with the model 
of individual firms in Appendix A, a firm’s debt beta can be derived from its asset beta or equity beta. Let Ei,t 
= Ai,t –Di,t be the market value of firm i’s shareholders equity, and let βA,i = 2, /M i M Miσ ρ σσ be firm i’s asset 
beta. Then firm i’s equity beta (βE,i) and debt beta (βD,i) satisfy:  
( ), , ,, , 1, ,
, , ,
i t i t i t
E i A i i A i
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N d
A D D D N d
β β β β
−∂
= = − =
∂
                          (B2) 
where the last equality in equation (B2) is obtained by using equation (B1). Equation (B2) is the same as 
equation (8) of the text. 
Based on equation (B2), a firm’s debt beta can be computed from its equity (stock) beta and the 
market value of the firm’s equity, Ei,t, if we also know the market value of the firm’s assets, Ai,t, and the 
volatility of the firm’s assets, σi. Similar to Marcus and Shaked (1984), we solve for Ai,t and σi by using 
information on the market value of the firm’s total equity, Ei,t, and its equity’s total volatility, call it σE,i: 
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The two nonlinear equations in (B3) are solved numerically to obtain Ai,t and σi, where τi = 10 years and Xi 
equals the book value of the firm’s debt. For robustness, we also obtain estimates assuming τi = 5 years.  
Once Ai,t and σi are derived, the firm’s debt beta is computed from equation (B2). Based on the same 
logic of Galai and Masulis (1976), the total volatility and residual volatility of the firm’s debt can be 
computed. The same factor in equation (B2) that converts equity beta to debt beta, [Ei,tN(-d1,i)]/ [Di,tN(d1,i)], 
is used to convert equity total volatility and equity residual volatility to debt total volatility and debt residual 
volatility. Debt residual volatility is a measure of the idiosyncratic default risk of the firm’s bond or loan. 
Calculation of Banks’ Asset Betas and Charter Values: 
The variables E0, A0, DT, and C in equations (12) to (14) of the text can be normalized by D0, which 
we proxy by the bank holding company’s book value of total non-ownership liabilities (debt). For simplicity, 
we approximate e-rTDTepT/D0 = 1, which implies p = (r-rd) and allows us to avoid using data on interest rates. 
From CRSP and Y9-C Reports or Compustat, we calculate E0/D0 and σE for the last trading day of each 
quarter, where σE is estimated from the prior 52 weekly stock returns. 
Since the most common and liquid CDS contract is for senior unsecured debt with a 5-year maturity, 
we use that contract’s spread for SCDS as reported by Markit for the last trading day of each quarter. The 
variable LGDQ in equation (14) is proxied by 1 minus Markit’s reported recovery rate for the same contract. 
Since the CDS contract is for senior debt, we adjust for any preferred stock and subordinated debt issued by 
the bank holding company. This is done by computing d2 in equation (14) using the ratio of the market value 
of assets to non-ownership liabilities that excludes preferred stock and subordinated debt.   
 We assume T = 5 years when numerically solving the normalized, three-equation system (12) to (14) 
for the three variables A0/D0, σ, and C/D0. Solutions are obtained for each bank-quarter. Then using the prior 
52 weekly bank stock returns and the CRSP value-weighted market index returns, we estimate each bank’s 
stock beta, βE, for each end-of-quarter date. The end-of-quarter values of E0/D0, A0/D0, C/D0, σ, and βE allow 
us to calculate end-of-quarter values of the bank’s asset return beta, βA, using equation (15) in the text. 
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APPENDIX C – Variable Description 
Spread The bond’s or loan’s credit spread. For a bond it equals the bond’s yield at issuance 
minus the contemporaneous yield on a Treasury security of the same maturity and 
currency. For floating-rate loans, it is the all-in-drawn spread over LIBOR as reported 
in DealScan. 
Rating Indicator variables for bond or loan ratings (at the notch level). 
Avg_Rating* The average of Moody’s and S&P’s rating (at the notch level) converted into a 
numerical scale (AAA/Aaa = 1, AA+/Aa1 = 2, …, BBB-/Bbb3 = 10). 
Debt Beta The issuer’s or borrower’s debt beta, derived from the issuer’s Equity Beta as detailed 
in Appendix B. For bond issuers, Equity Beta is computed from weekly returns of the 
issuer’s stock and the MSCI World Index using a standard market model estimated 
during the 52 weeks preceding each issue. For syndicated loan borrowers, Equity Beta 
is computed from weekly returns of the borrowing firm’s stock and the CRSP Value-
weighted Index using a standard market model estimated during the 52 weeks 
preceding each issue. From this model we also get the Equity Residual Volatility. 
Debt Res. Vol. The issuer’s debt residual volatility, estimated from the Equity Residual Volatility as 
detailed in Appendix B.  
Bank Weighted 
Debt Beta** 
A weighted average of the debt betas of the borrowers to whom the bank granted 
credit via the syndicated loan market in a given year, using the relative size of the 
bank’s investment in each loan as weights. 
Bank Weighted 
Excess Spread** 
A weighted average of the credit rating-adjusted spreads of the syndicated loans 
originated by the bank in a given year, using the relative size of the bank’s investment 
in each loan as weights. 
Bank Asset Beta The beta of a bank holding company’s total assets, estimated from market values of 
equity, CDS spreads, and balance sheet data as detailed in Appendix B. 
 
Controls  
Bond or Loan characteristics 
Face Value The natural log of the USD equivalent face value of bond or loan. 
Maturity The natural log of the years to maturity of the bond or loan.  
Seniority A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bond or loan is subordinated. 
International Mkt* A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bond is a eurobond. 
Negative Pledge* A dummy variable that equals 1 if the bond issue has a negative pledge clause. The 
negative pledge clause restricts the issuer from using its assets as collateral for 
future debt obligations. 
Reg D* A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bond is Regulation D. 
Reg S* A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bond is Regulation S. 
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Rule 144a* A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bond is Rule 144a. 
Fungible* A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bond is fungible. 
Force majeure* A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bond has a force majeure clause. 
Shelf registration* A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bond is shelf-registered. 
Cross-default* A dummy variable that equals 1 if the bond issue has a cross-default clause. The 
cross-default clause avoids the possibility of selective default on the part of the 
issuer. If the issuer is insolvent on one loan or bond issue, it is automatically 
considered as insolvent on all other loans and obligations. 
Year Year fixed effects. 
Currency* Currency fixed effects. 
Bid-Ask Spread* The average bid-ask spread over the 60 trading days following the issuance of each 
bond. This variable is available for 2,395 bonds (out of the entire sample of 3,924 
bonds). 
Credit Line** A dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan was a revolving line of credit. 
Refinanced** A dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan was refinanced. 
Renewal** A dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan was a renewal of a previous loan. 
Secured** A dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan was secured. 
Dividend Restrict** A dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan contains a covenant restricting dividends. 
Corporate Purpose** A dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan’s primary purpose was corporate. 
Debt Repay** A dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan’s primary purpose was to repay debt. 
Working Capital** A dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan’s primary purpose was for working capital. 
Bond issuer or firm borrower characteristics 
Size The natural log of the USD equivalent issuer’s market capitalization. 
Country* Country fixed effects. 
Industry Industry fixed effects. 
Bank characteristics  
Ln (Assets) The natural log of the bank holding company’s total assets. 
Capital-Asset Ratio The bank holding company’s Tier 1 capital to total assets ratio. 
Capital-RWA Ratio The bank holding company’s Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets ratio. 
Equity-Asset Ratio The bank holding company’s book-value of common equity-to-assets ratio. 
Charter Value The bank holding company’s charter value-to-debt ratio estimated from market 
values of equity, CDS spreads, and balance sheet data as detailed in Appendix B. 
 
*Used for bonds only 
**Used for syndicated loans only  
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Table 1 – Bond Summary Statistics 
 
Detailed variable descriptions are reported in Appendix C. 
 
Panel A: Variable Mean by Credit Rating 
Rating Obs. Spread 
Maturity Face Value Debt 
(years) (USD, m) Beta Res. Vol 
AAA/Aaa 132 80.70 4.82 1,820 0.20 1.03 
AA/Aa 1,156 88.20 7.81 889 0.08 0.34 
A/A 1,587 114.82 8.44 864 0.10 0.44 
BBB/Baa 1,049 149.05 8.01 661 0.10 0.54 
Total 3,924 114.98 8.02 849 0.10 0.46 
 
Panel B: Variable Mean by Year 
Year Obs. Spread Rating 
Maturity Face Value Debt 
(years) (USD, m) Beta Res. Vol 
1999 158 104.40 5.54 9.10 836 0.15 0.52 
2000 219 112.08 5.42 7.40 974 0.12 0.61 
2001 337 114.04 6.22 8.02 1,030 0.11 0.54 
2002 305 93.99 6.60 9.23 776 0.09 0.46 
2003 376 72.11 6.71 8.77 606 0.08 0.42 
2004 275 49.58 6.32 7.74 547 0.06 0.21 
2005 284 45.70 5.99 7.81 521 0.01 0.05 
2006 292 60.41 5.78 9.05 735 0.01 0.06 
2007 353 77.98 5.19 8.99 796 0.02 0.06 
2008 393 173.70 4.83 7.67 997 0.10 0.45 
2009 554 215.63 5.27 6.65 1,120 0.22 1.13 
2010 378 149.29 5.53 7.21 988 0.13 0.46 





Table 2 – Regression of Bond Credit Spreads on Ratings and Debt Systematic Risk 
 
Columns (1) and (3) report coefficients of OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered both at the 
year and issuer level. Columns (2) and (4) report average coefficients from yearly Fama-MacBeth 
regressions that control for ratings-by-time fixed effects. The dependent variable is Spread, equal to the 
difference between the bond yield at issuance and the Treasury yield of the same maturity and currency. 
Detailed variable descriptions are reported in Appendix C. Coefficients for control variables are not reported 
for ease of exposition. t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% 
level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Whole Sample Bid-Ask Spread Sample 
  Fama-MacBeth  Fama-MacBeth 
AA+/Aa1 
82.16*** 18.74 100.42** -10.73 
(4.02) (1.12) (2.53) (-0.42) 
AA/Aa2 
92.15*** 21.00 114.86*** -2.98 
(3.95) (1.03) (2.91) (-0.10) 
AA-/Aa3 
111.65*** 32.77 130.24*** 9.84 
(4.38) (1.62) (3.04) (0.30) 
A+/A1 
119.28*** 42.59** 129.44*** 15.09 
(4.03) (1.96) (3.09) (0.48) 
A/A2 
134.28*** 54.17** 145.40*** 32.34 
(4.33) (2.28) (3.24) (0.94) 
A-/A3 
153.90*** 61.81*** 155.41*** 36.23 
(4.89) (2.81) (3.97) (1.20) 
BBB+/Baa1 
182.43*** 87.52*** 176.56*** 55.10* 
(4.55) (3.14) (4.11) (1.81) 
BBB/Baa2 
196.32*** 99.77*** 193.21*** 79.07** 
(4.15) (3.04) (3.72) (2.11) 
BBB-/Baa3 
208.11*** 107.14*** 209.93*** 95.57*** 
(4.75) (4.06) (4.56) (2.98) 
Debt Beta 
105.42*** 82.91*** 139.49*** 91.67** 
(3.44) (4.75) (3.69) (2.33) 
ln (Debt Residual Volatility) 
0.432 1.57 -1.185 1.75 
(0.21) (0.88) (-0.65) (1.07) 
Bid-Ask Spread 
  90.44*** 86.97** 
  (3.63) (2.55) 
Obs. 3,924 3,924 2,395 2,395 





Table 3 – Syndicated Loan Summary Statistics 
 
Detailed variable descriptions are reported in Appendix C. 
 
Panel A: Variable Mean by Credit Rating 
Rating Obs. Spread 
Maturity Face Value Debt 
(years) (USD, m) Beta Res. Vol 
AAA/AA/A 170 42.08 3.67 1,499 0.03 0.01 
BBB 516 120.31 4.36 765 0.08 0.02 
BB 1,683 236.19 5.38 427 0.15 0.07 
B/CCC 746 311.56 5.53 383 0.18 0.11 
Total 3,115 224.45 5.15 531 0.14 0.07 
 
Panel B: Variable Mean by Year 
Year Obs. Spread Rating 
Maturity Face Value Debt 
(years) (USD, m) Beta Res. Vol 
1995 90 174.60 12.36 5.14 234 0.12 0.07 
1996 78 199.81 12.40 5.01 242 0.12 0.12 
1997 51 190.73 12.41 5.79 351 0.07 0.08 
1998 74 213.41 12.54 6.05 291 0.11 0.07 
1999 92 244.59 12.25 6.19 394 0.15 0.10 
2000 150 253.17 12.38 5.74 323 0.17 0.16 
2001 142 217.02 11.61 4.76 377 0.18 0.15 
2002 189 266.17 12.13 4.76 333 0.18 0.12 
2003 218 255.79 11.93 4.41 345 0.19 0.11 
2004 332 197.58 11.85 4.91 453 0.13 0.05 
2005 399 173.75 11.72 5.12 538 0.09 0.03 
2006 325 170.64 11.65 5.30 719 0.09 0.03 
2007 402 194.19 12.10 5.47 864 0.09 0.03 
2008 85 265.24 11.62 4.73 998 0.17 0.06 
2009 51 360.20 11.61 3.89 364 0.46 0.22 
2010 154 338.56 11.95 4.96 456 0.19 0.08 
2011 215 291.27 11.64 5.43 615 0.15 0.04 
2012 68 306.68 11.69 5.28 692 0.25 0.08 
















Table 4 – Regression of Syndicated Loan Spreads on Ratings and Debt Systematic Risk 
 
Columns (1) and (2) report coefficients of OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered both at the 
year and issuer level. Columns (3) and (4) report average coefficients from yearly Fama-MacBeth 
regressions that control for ratings-by-time fixed effects. The dependent variable is the syndicated loan all-in 
Spread. Detailed variable descriptions are reported in Appendix C. Coefficients for control variables are not 
reported for ease of exposition. t-statisics are given in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 
5%, 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
   Fama-MacBeth 
BBB 
47.47*** 41.70*** 49.32*** 26.06* 
(8.71) (7.10) (6.39) (1.92) 
BB 
111.45*** 102.67*** 111.80*** 83.52*** 
(16.14) (13.55) (13.79) (5.43) 
B 
176.36*** 165.71*** 168.19*** 132.15*** 
(21.33) (17.92) (11.50) (8.25) 
CCC 
276.64*** 265.36*** 163.05*** 146.74*** 
(8.27) (7.84) (4.40) (4.39) 
Debt Beta 
109.24*** 83.30*** 99.63*** 41.71** 
(7.37) (4.47) (7.88) (2.36) 
ln (Debt Residual Volatility) 
  4.74***  12.06*** 
  (3.31)  (3.89) 
Obs. 3,115 3,115 3,115 3,115 
































Table 5 – Regressions of Credit Ratings on Debt Systematic Risk 
 
Columns 1 and 2 reports coefficients of OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered both at the 
year and issuer level while Columns 3 and 4 reports average coefficients of yearly Fama-MacBeth 
regressions. Column 5 reports the results of an ordered probit model. Panel A uses corporate bond data 
where the dependent variable is a bond’s Avg_Rating, i.e. the average of Moody’s and S&P’s issue ratings, 
converted into numerical scale (AAA/Aaa = 1, AA-/Aa1 = 2, …, BBB-/Bbb3 = 10). Panel B uses syndicated 
loan data where the dependent variable is a syndicated loan’s Moody’s rating, except when unavailable it is 
replaced with the loan’s S&P rating. Ratings are also converted to the same numerical scale (AAA/Aaa = 1, 
AA-/Aa1 = 2, …, BBB-/Bbb3 = 10). Coefficients for control variables are not reported for ease of 
exposition. Detailed variable descriptions are reported in Appendix C. t-statistics are given in parentheses. 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
A. Corporate Bond Credit Ratings 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
   Fama-MacBeth Probit 
Debt Beta 
1.875*** 0.917 4.25*** 1.827* 0.639*** 
(2.73) (1.28) (3.39) (1.809) (3.48) 
ln (Debt Residual Volatility) 
  0.123***   0.147*** 0.076*** 
  (4.12)   (3.50) (6.48) 
Obs. 3,924 3,924 3,924 3,924 3,924 
Adj. R2 0.47 0.48 0.67 0.69  
 
B. Syndicated Loan Credit Ratings 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
   Fama-MacBeth Probit 
Debt Beta 
2.69*** -0.25 2.75*** -0.69 0.06 
(9.04) (-0.63) (7.82) (-1.17) (0.26) 
ln (Debt Residual Volatility) 
  0.49***   0.75*** 0.27*** 
  (8.88)   (3.34) (8.48) 
Obs. 3,115 3,115 3,115 3,115 3,115 























Table 6 – Regressions of Bank Loan Systematic Risk and Capital 
 
Reported are coefficients of OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered both at the year 
and bank level. The sample period is 1995 to 2010. The dependent variable is a bank’s choice of 
newly-originated syndicated loan Systematic Risk for a given year. It is measured in one of two 
ways: Debt Beta is a weighted average of the debt betas of the firms to whom the bank granted credit 
via the syndicated loan market, using the relative size of the bank’s investment in each loan as 
weights. Excess Spread is a weighted average of the credit rating-adjusted spreads of the syndicated 
loans originated by the bank, using the relative size of the bank’s investment in each loan as weights. 
Capital-Asset Ratio and Capital-RWA Ratio are the bank’s prior-year Tier 1 capital to total assets 
ratio and Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets ratio, respectively. Ln (Assets) is the natural log of the 
bank’s prior-year total assets. Detailed variable description is reported in Appendix C. Regressions 
include a set of yearly fixed effects. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at 
1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Debt Beta Excess Spread Excess Spread with Debt Beta Sample 











Panel A: Capital to Total Assets 
Capital-Asset Ratio 
-0.00830*** -0.00847*** -1.837*** -2.116*** -2.532*** -2.495*** 
(-3.29) (-2.94) (-3.61) (-2.99) (-4.43) (-4.36) 
Ln (Assets) 
-0.00650*** -0.00544** -3.424*** -3.717*** -2.250*** -2.448*** 
(-2.90) (-2.26) (-5.18) (-5.07) (-2.86) (-2.96) 
Obs. 1,177 1,028 1,581 1,326 1,177 1,028 
Adj. R2 0.305 0.275 0.085 0.090 0.109 0.106 
       
Panel B: Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets 
Capital-RWA Ratio 
-0.00799*** -0.00694*** -4.138*** -2.749*** -2.060*** -2.563*** 
(-4.09) (-3.07) (-7.01) (-6.67) (-3.54) (-3.27) 
Ln (Assets) 
-0.00709*** -0.00572** -2.488*** -4.612*** -2.331*** -1.740*** 
(-3.32) (-2.46) (-6.64) (-7.44) (-3.13) (-2.94) 
Obs. 1,160 1,015 1,552 1,305 1,160 1,015 




















Table 7 – Bank Summary Statistics 
 
Detailed variable descriptions are reported in Appendix C. 
Panel A: All Bank Holding Companies 
 Mean Standard Dev. Minimum Median Maximum 
Bank Asset Beta, βA 0.1747 0.1045 0.0571 0.1446 0.4604 
Charter Value, C/D0 0.0407 0.0517 0.0000 0.0177 0.1730 
Total Assets ($Billions) 506 595 9 217 2,520 
Equity Ratio 0.0794 0.0228 0.0468 0.0751 0.1345 
      
Panel B: Traditional Banks Only 
 Mean Standard Dev. Minimum Median Maximum 
Bank Asset Beta, βA 0.1578 0.0777 0.0571 0.1423 0.4604 
Charter Value, C/D0 0.0407 0.0476 0.0000 0.0263 0.1730 
Total Assets ($Billions) 537 678 9 203 2,520 
Capital Ratio 0.0774 0.0182 0.0517 0.0747 0.1219 
 
 
Table 8 – Regressions of Bank Systematic Risk and Charter Value 
 
Reported are coefficients of OLS regressions with robust standard errors.  As indicated in the table, 
the regressions adjust for different types of fixed effects and employ different data subsamples. The 
sample period is 2001Q4 to 2014Q4. The dependent variable is a bank holding company’s asset 
Systematic Risk, equal to Bank Asset Beta. Bank Asset Beta is a model-implied estimate of the beta of 
the bank holding company’s total asset returns. Charter Value is the bank holding company’s model-
implied charter value-to-debt ratio.  Ln (Assets) is the natural log of the holding company’s prior 
quarter total assets. Capital-Asset Ratio is the bank holding company’s prior-quarter Tier 1 capital-
to-assets ratio. Equity-Asset Ratio is the bank holding company’s book value of common equity-to-
assets ratio. Detailed variable descriptions are reported in Appendix C. t-statistics are in parentheses. 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  All Years, 2001 to 2014 Excluding 2008 - 2009 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Charter Value 
-0.285** -0.521*** -0.470*** -0.440*** -0.394* -0.394*** 
(-2.25) (-5.32) (-2.92) (-4.01) (-1.84) (-3.08) 
Ln (Assets) 
-0.012 -0.046*** -0.017 -0.051** -0.007 -0.048** 
(0.001) (-3.357) (-1.00) (-2.51) (-0.38) (-2.04) 
Capital-Asset Ratio 
0.391 0.173 1.075***  1.302***  
(-0.54) (-0.61) (-2.99)  (-3.134)  
Equity-Asset Ratio 
   1.347***  1.376*** 
   (-4.28)  (-3.61) 
Traditional Banks Only Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
Bank Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 669 669 669 1,059 550 872 
Adjusted R2 0.081 0.563 0.709 0.768 0.723 0.772 
 
